

Psychoanalyzing architecture: The uncanny, the libido and the built environment¹

ERAN NEUMAN

ABSTRACT

The essay examines the influence of the psychoanalysis on architecture. Through the analysis of Anthony Vidler's discussion of the architectural uncanny and Sylvia Lavin's architectural forms of libido, it outlines the significance of psychoanalytical discourse in architecture. My main claim is that psychoanalysis not only assisted in positing the human subject in the architectural realm in order to examine the ways in which they shape each other, but also that this discourse underwent a shift between the early 1990s and the turn of the new millennium. Initially focusing on the concept of the uncanny, psychoanalysis in the early 1990s offered architecture ways to examine the deconstructed, the void and the fragmented. Transitioning to discuss the libido in the past decade, psychoanalysis proposed architecture that would concentrate on the constructed. This shift marks a change in the cultural and intellectual perception of architectural discourse. The paper concludes with a discussion of the rejection of the psychoanalysis of architecture by Deleuze and Guattari, and their interpretations of architect-theorists such as Greg Lynn.

Introduction

This essay discusses two models for the psychoanalysis of architecture, which were developed in North America over the last three decades. In the mid-1980s, after a decade in which deconstructivist theories dominated spatial analysis in architecture, psychoanalysis found its way into the writings of prominent architectural historians and theoreticians and infused their methods of architectural analysis on the symbolic and functional levels. The 1980s culminated with the "Deconstructivist Architecture" (1988) exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, which was co-curated by the New Zealand-born, New York-based architectural theoretician Mark Wigley and the architectural icon, Philip Johnson (Johnson and Wigley, 1988). The exhibition presented the work of eight leading architects—including Daniel Libeskind, Frank Gehry, Rem Koolhaas, Zaha Hadid, Peter Eisenman and Coop Himmelbl(l)au—who were occupied with deconstructivist

theories in their work and marked a milestone, after a decade and a half in which architectural oppositions were positioned against structuralist formulations of architectural meanings. Journals of critical theory, such as *Oppositions* (edited by key figures including Peter Eisenman, Kenneth Frampton, Mario Gandelsonas, Anthony Vidler, Kurt W. Forster and Diana Agrest), voiced ideas about the break from the mega-structures and meta-narratives (Hays, 1998). The 1988 MoMA exhibition reframed ideas circulating in *Oppositions* and set the tone for the emergence of a more stabile discourse in deconstructivist architectural theories in a new journal called *Assemblage* (Hays, Ingraham and Kennedy, 1986).

At this point in the critical discourse, North America set the tone for the emergence of new methods for spatial, tactile and visual analysis of architecture, mainly because its universities—Harvard, Princeton, Yale and Columbia on the East Coast and UC Berkeley, UCLA and Rice in the West—employed the most dominant thinkers in the field. British scholars such as Anthony Vidler and Kenneth Frampton were hired by Princeton and Columbia, respectively. Barcelona-born Beatriz Colomina started teaching at Columbia University in 1982 and then moved to Princeton in 1988. Mark Wigley took the opposite track and started teaching at Princeton in 1986 and then moved over to Columbia. All of this activity led to North American dominance of architectural discourse, but some so-called peripheral voices also flourished elsewhere. The work of scholars such as Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, in what was called the Venice School, had considerable influence on architectural thought in both Europe and North America. Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre established a prominent voice in Delft, the Netherlands, while in London, Mark Cousins (on the sociopolitical and psychoanalytical sides) and Dalibor Vesely (on the phenomenological side) proposed an alternative to the North American discourse. The proliferation of voices enhanced the architectural discourse between Europe and North America and led to the emergence of many new ideas. However, North America—and especially its East Coast institutions—dominated the scene.

Within this context, psychoanalysis began to influence the architectural discourse. These influences were not foreign to architecture and did not create a total break with the deconstructivist method of architectural analysis, mainly because the prominent figures referred to in the psychoanalytical discussion of architecture were not strange to deconstructivist thinkers. Jacques Derrida, who was undoubtedly the most influential deconstructivist thinker on architecture, often referred to Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. As early as 1967, in his seminal book *Of Grammatology*, Derrida (1974) mentions Freud in relation to the pleasure principle. In *Marges de la philosophie*, while developing a discussion on “*la différence*,” Derrida ties the concept to the Freudian subconscious: “[t]he putting into question of the authority of consciousness is first and always differential” (1972:69). The difference becomes the subconscious of the text. While Lacan is mentioned only briefly in Derrida’s early writings, in later publications, Derrida most frequently refers to the French

psychoanalyst's work in "*Le facteur de la vérité*" (1980), in which he defines the structure of truth in Lacan's discourse.

The shift from deconstructivist theories to psychoanalysis allowed architectural historians and theoreticians to relocate the human subject within the architectural realm. Focusing on the logocentrism of the architectural sign—whether referred to as a binary structure, as Roland Barthes (1997) and Umberto Eco (1997) suggested in their separate writings, or as a configuration with multiple meanings as in Derrida's writing—these discourses did not incorporate the user of architecture in their analysis of architectural form and space. Barthes and Eco focused on the signification of architectural properties such as form, treating it as an independent linguistic structure based on space, material and image without addressing the identity of the perceivers of these properties or the ways in which these properties were perceived. Derrida attempted to break with the binary structure of signifier–signified and argued for the multiplicity of the architectural sign. Whether attempting to stabilize or break the sign, neither discourse located a human subject as the generator and perceiver of the architectural signs and the one that deciphers them. Architecture stood as an almost autonomous entity, without a firmly or loosely defined subject with an identity, desires and consciousness.

Psychoanalysis provided a platform to insert the human subject into the architectural realm as a figure that both produces architecture and is being produced by architecture. As such, not only was architecture conceived as a reflection of one's psyche, but the space, image and tectonics of architecture were treated as stimuli faced by the human subject that influence and shape his or her psyche and mind. The more complex the architectural realm, the more stimuli the subject has to face and the more likely that they influence him or her. In that respect, architecture began to be treated and analyzed as an agency that transforms the human subject from a non-specified organic entity into a formulated subject based on preconceived ideologies (whether these ideologies are deliberately articulated or embedded within the architectural text as an implicit notion). In the 1990s, the infiltration of psychoanalysis into the architectural discourse led to a change in the overall perception of the relation between the human subject and the corresponding realm—space, environment and matter. The psychoanalytical understanding of space allowed for the expansion of space analysis beyond the traditional art historical methods. Indeed, other social disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology, addressed the relationship between man and the environment as provided by architecture; nevertheless, psychoanalysis allowed addressing pathologies of the self in relation to the architectural space and image beyond practical inquiries of the communal relationship to architecture. It enabled the discussion and analysis of relations between space and human subject to be kept on a more abstract level, without necessarily applying empirical methods to decipher them.

Yet, in a process similar to the doubt and differences of opinion that kept psychoanalysis dynamic and led to the refinement of ideas and methods over the years—Melanie Klein (1977) on Freud's ideas about mother-child relations, the

evolution of Wilfred Bion's (1970) structural psychoanalysis or Donald Winnicott's (1931) discourse on transitional objects—the psychoanalytical discourse in architecture was also transformed and went through several phases. In this essay, I outline two modes of spatio-psychoanalytical analysis in architecture as they evolved over the last 20 years in North America. My discussion presents the ways in which psychoanalysis influenced spatial and image analysis in architecture and the ways in which it shaped the understanding of architecture. I focus on two main models of psychoanalysis of architecture: the first provided by Anthony Vidler and the second by Sylvia Lavin. My focus on these models is based on the assumption that they indicate a shift in the cultural application of psychoanalysis in architecture over the last two decades.

It is important to stress that this focus on models developed by Vidler and Lavin stems from the dominance of their work in the field of psychoanalysis of architecture. Both have presented the clearest and most solid voices in the field of psychoanalysis of architecture in the last two decades. While other scholars—most notably Mark Cousins, a trained psychoanalyst and an architecture educator—contributed immensely to the field, it is safe to say that in their books, Vidler and Lavin crystallized ideas about psychoanalysis and architecture in the brightest, most incisive way.

Vidler's uncanny

Anthony Vidler was certainly one of the most prominent architectural theoreticians to use psychoanalytical concepts in his writing, starting in the early 1990s. Initial encounters with psychoanalysis were first collected in his book *The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely* (1992), and were further developed in his book, *Warped Space: Art, Architecture and the Anxiety of Modern Culture* (2000). In these two books, Vidler does not provide an explicit method for the psychoanalysis of space, nor does he directly commit himself to the subject matter. In the preface to *The Architectural Uncanny*, he even declares that

In the following book, I have not attempted an exhaustive historical or theoretical treatment of the subject [that is, the Freudian *unheimlich*], nor have I constructed or applied any comprehensive theory of the uncanny based in phenomenology, negative dialectics or psychoanalysis (1992:x).

Instead, Vidler claims that he has “chosen approaches that seem relevant for the interpretation of contemporary buildings and projects provoked by the resurgent interest in the uncanny as a metaphor for a fundamentally unlivable modern condition (1992:x).” Indeed, he does not locate his discourse and method of interpretation in the make-believe clinic of an architectural psychoanalyst. The

projects that he analyzes are not stretched out on a couch expressing streams of consciousness and waiting for the analyst to decipher them. Instead, his discourse proposes interrelating architecture and psychoanalysis far more profoundly.

Vidler treats the architectural realm as one that sets the conditions for the emergence of certain pathologies. In that sense, architecture provides and creates a realm in which a range of psychological conditions may surface. Yet, the architecture that Vidler is referring to is—obviously—entirely manmade. As such, architecture in his discourse is located between two positions: on the one hand, it is generated by the human subject, and on the other, it is generating the human subject. Elsewhere, I elaborated on this reciprocal nature of architecture in relation to the human subject, how they are interdependent and generate each other (Neuman, 2008). Vidler does not fully and explicitly address these notions. This may be in order to avoid outlining a clear method for the psychoanalysis of architecture. Nevertheless, the subtext of his writing suggests complex guidelines for the psychoanalytical understanding of architecture. These guidelines are based on the assumption that architecture is, in effect, mutually intertwined with the human subject as the generator and perceiver of the space. Thus, it is impossible not to treat architecture as a reflection of the human subject's psyche and the human subject's psyche as a product of architecture—and both as inseparable entities. Accordingly, analyzing architecture may reveal the conscious, as well as the unconscious, of the human subject. Moreover, the analysis of the human psyche may allude to the architecture that it might create.

It is important to stress, however, that the very fact that architecture may contribute to the emergence of unknown pathologies did not lead Vidler to frame it in instrumental terms as a functional device that shapes and reshapes the psyche in a rational way. On the contrary, Vidler perceives architecture as a possible reflection of the psyche's wish to express what can be defined as notions that are beyond rationality, such as perverse tendencies, unexpressed desires and streams of consciousness. In that respect, it is not animated in a singular fashion in metaphysical or spiritual terms as an entity that has wishes and can function accordingly (here Vidler goes against Louis Kahn's phenomenological discourse on material presence and spatial conditions.) Instead, architecture is understood as an *extension* of the psyche that is part of both the conscious and the unconscious.

Given his perception of the relationship between space and the psyche, it is not surprising that Vidler uses *heimlich* and *unheimlich* as concepts that interrelate architecture and psychoanalysis. They allow him to discuss conscious and unconscious manifestations of the psyche in architecture, as well as the generation of conscious and unconscious notions in the psyche (such as the traumatic or the sublime) by architecture. The *heimlich* is where the conscious psyche may reside, while the *unheimlich* feeling may emanate from unconscious. Over the years, many architectural theoreticians have argued that architecture's primary role is to create what we can define as a *heimlich* condition: architecture has to provide a home, a shelter, a homey feeling, in its various typologies and manifestations (private or

public, for individuals or communities). Here, architecture is perceived in rational terms as being expected to create a place for the familiar and the known. What can be described as *unheimlich* is related to as a condition of modernity that alludes to mental displacement (making people feel that they are not in their place) and to the estrangement of humanity from its being-in-the-world, to reiterate Martin Heidegger's (1996) concept. The psyche is "displaced" from the familiar by architecture that is not decipherable by the conscious psyche.

To develop his discussion, Vidler interweaves the ideas of innumerable philosophers, theoreticians and psychoanalysts, but he mostly refers to Freud's celebrated 1919 essay *Das Unheimlich* (Freud, 1997), where the Viennese psychoanalyst discusses the *unheimlich* as an outcome of a defamiliarized, strange and unknown condition that might emanate from the unconscious. According to Freud, the *unheimlich* creates a feeling of mental displacement caused by the surfacing of unconscious and unfamiliar feelings. The *heimlich* in Freud's essay (and as Vidler also expands on the term; see 1992:24) refers to the homey in its multiple references: the homeland, the neighborly, the domestic and, of course, that which is at home, thus suggesting a spatial and territorial understanding of the concept, similar to the ways in which the architectural discourse can suggest.

Vidler's reference to Freud's writings and beyond offers an opportunity to expand on the reciprocity of architecture and the human subject and to delve into discussions of the various aspects of the human subject (body, mind, self, feelings or thoughts). In *The Architectural Uncanny*, for example, he draws a parallel between the effect of an *unheimlich* feeling on the human psyche, which results in a perception of one's own body as a fragmented entity, and the fragmentation of architecture in the late 1980s and early 1990s by leading architects such as the Viennese firm Coop Himmelb(l)au (1992:69–82) and the French architect Bernard Tschumi (1992:101–114). It is here that architecture serves as a reflection of one's own body; yet at the same time, it may create this particular body image in the architectural user's psyche. Vidler's reference to the demolition of the classical body, both human and architectural, into fragmented entities treats both of them, in a way, in similar terms (1992:69–165). The human body is fragmented as a result of the alienation of the human subject by modernization, and architecture corresponds to this fragmentation. Later in *The Architectural Uncanny*, Vidler develops a perception of a somewhat looser connection between architecture and the self. He refers to urban scale and discusses its effects on the human psyche and the emergence of new pathologies. Yet, while he indeed refers to human subjects and their environment as interrelated entities, he avoids drawing direct parallels between them.

Lavin's architectural libido

An equally illuminating psychoanalytical approach to architecture was offered by the architectural theoretician and historian Sylvia Lavin. Lavin's approach of psychoanalysis in architecture appeared in several of her writings during the 1990s and culminated in her 2004 book, *Form Follows Libido: Architecture and Richard Neutra in Psychoanalytic Culture*. In this book, Lavin, like Vidler, did not attempt to outline a method for the psychoanalysis of architecture, nor did she explicitly try to offer an understanding of the psychoanalytical human subject, as a general concept, through its location in the architectural realm. The human subject is not treated directly as being located in space and the mutual influences between space and the human subject are not described in reciprocal terms, explicitly or implicitly. Instead, Lavin offers a completely different way to connect architecture and psychoanalysis. *Form Follows Libido* is a book about the work of the architect Richard Neutra, who was born in Vienna in 1892 and immigrated to the United States in 1923. Neutra was part of a circle in Vienna and Los Angeles that was influenced by Freud's work and ideas, an influence that found its way into the architect's work, writings and theory. By writing about Neutra's personal and professional history and discussing the influences of the Vienna and Los Angeles psychoanalytical circles on his work, Lavin presents a model for a psychoanalytical understanding of architecture.

Indeed, on the one hand, Lavin offers a contextualization of psychoanalysis and architecture in relation to a historical moment: the circumstances in which psychoanalysis influenced Neutra's work in the early twentieth century. This might be seen as merely drawing on the history of ideas and concepts. Yet, through this specific case study, she offers a method beyond the historicization of psychoanalytical understanding in architecture as a particular case that is relevant only to Neutra and his associates at the time. In fact, the logic of Lavin's work outlines a theory of psychoanalysis of architecture based on the interrelation of psychoanalysis and architecture as it prevailed in early modernist southern California during the first half of the twentieth century. This does not imply that the example of Neutra can be universalized and applied to any case, but only suggests that Lavin's discourse encompasses a meta-structure for the interrelation of architecture and psychoanalysis. Furthermore, Lavin sees the importance of theorizing concepts in a historical fashion and not creating independent and autonomous discourses based on abstract concepts. She does not offer a general take on the subject, but rather seeks to view the history and philosophy of ideas in their historical and intellectual contexts. Yet, at the same time, she implies that there is an ability to project some of the expressed ideas and discuss them in an inclusive manner.

Given that, it is interesting that Lavin chooses to discuss the libido as a drive that directs human subjects and makes them behave in one way or another, in relation to architecture. For her, the libido, as a concept that goes beyond sexual desire and instead is referred to as a psychic energy, is at the basis of humankind's

existence. Humankind's desire to build, construct and expand is libidinal, and architecture is a product of that tendency. Furthermore, since for Lavin the libido is at the basis of the understanding of humankind, it is also one of the most fundamental aspects in psychoanalysis. As she puts it, "[p]sychoanalysis is inconceivable without its language of drives, instincts and above all libido" (2004:72). This perception does not mean she neglects to relate to the libido as a concept that has meaning beyond psychoanalysis. In *Form Follows Libido*, she interlinks, for instance, the psychoanalytical libido with architecture. Here, she returns to the modernist architectural attempt to cure some neuroses that led to a certain behavior as a result of these psychic energies and draws a parallel between Freud's therapeutic methods and these architectural attempts.

At this point, Lavin's discourse becomes historical, not only because she draws parallels between the common ways to treat the libido in architecture and psychoanalysis at the time, but also because she refers to and interprets Neutra's interest in expanding Freud's theory on the libido into an architectural theory on the ways in which libidinal energy is sublimated in both cases. Neutra, as Lavin shows, referred to Freud's concept of sublimation in order to define architectural sublimation and the redirection of energies that might have originated in a libidinal context, but migrated into a different one. Indeed, it is here that Lavin historically contextualizes the connection between the understandings of libido in psychoanalysis and then in architecture, but the comparison does not remain solely on the disciplinary level. The underlying concept of her discourse on Neutra and his attempt to create a theory of libido in architecture assumes that understanding the architectural libido is crucial for understanding the emergence of architecture at large and therefore needs to be generally addressed. Neutra might have been the pioneer of this method, but its relevance is not limited to his time and the prevalence of theories of libido. In this subtextual argument, Lavin, in fact, presents Neutra's attempt to transform the Freudian concepts into architecture as a case study for an overall theory.

The choice to discuss architecture in relation to the libido in a historical contextualization allows Lavin to relate to architecture as energy. Architecture as an outcome of libido cannot be treated as an object (fetishized or not), but as an energy that manifests itself in reality. In that respect, the book's name, *Form Follows Libido*, is slightly deceptive. By no means does Lavin treat architecture only on the formal level. On the contrary, in her historicization of Neutra's architecture and his contemporaries, she evokes a discussion of the shift in architecture from a discourse on space to one on environment. In the postwar years, architects, architectural historians and theoreticians (most notably Reyner Banham, 1969) related to architecture not in terms of object, form and space, but as multilayered environments based on complex systems. As opposed to the architectural object and form, the environment was discussed as dynamic and fluid (similar to contemporary Deleuzian accounts of today's architecture in flux). Thus, treating architecture as environment rather than as a finalized object allows Lavin to see the environment as

energy in constant flux, similar to the energy of the libido. The underlying interpretive method in her text requires the same approach: architecture is an environment that is in constant change.

Modes of psychoanalytical attack

The two models for the psychoanalysis of architecture that I have discussed drew upon psychoanalytical theories while elaborating on the relations between psychoanalysis and architecture as separate disciplines. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, neither drew parallels between psychoanalysis and architecture naively in a direct fashion. Stemming from critical discourses, they did not attempt to create an applied theory for the psychoanalytical interpretation of architecture. In fact, both models suggest incorporating psychoanalysis in architecture while mentioning the limits of this kind of interrelation. In the introduction to *Warped Spaces*, Vidler, for instance, accepts what he rejected in *The Architectural Uncanny* and declares that he has

from time to time imagined that a psychoanalysis of architecture might be possible—as if architecture were on the couch so to speak—that would reveal, by implication, and reflection, its relationship with its “subjects.” Thus personified as the “other,” architecture and its relationship to space may be, in Lacanian terms, figured as the mirror, and thence the frame of anxiety and shape of desire (Vidler, 2000:12).

Yet, he does not view the architectural examples he cites as a reflection of the psyche per se, and therefore he has “taken the decidedly poetic liberty of shifting the emphasis of psychoanalytical interpretation from subject to object” (2000:12). Referring to examples of criticism of psychoanalytical interpretation expressed by Bruno Zevi in his seminal book *Architecture as Space: How to Look at Architecture* (1957), Lavin argues that

psychoanalysis is enjoyed, toyed with, misapplied, resolutely rejected but present all the same, just as Neutra treated psychoanalysis with both fluidity and ambivalence. In fact, Neutra and countless others played a significant role in producing the still pervasive culture of psychoanalysis through such appropriations (2004:21).

Although here and there Vidler and Lavin refer to psychoanalysis in a somewhat ambivalent fashion, as Lavin says, both accounts treat psychoanalysis in a dignified manner. Their accounts do not attempt to discredit the psychological discipline as does the criticism of psychoanalysis heard from various directions, but

instead seek to outline the limitations and potentialities in the interconnections of architecture and psychoanalysis. Vidler and Lavin are not exceptional here. As a matter of fact, criticism of the psychoanalysis of architecture is still rather limited, arising only occasionally from other psychological and social disciplines (behavioral, communal, etc.) or being briefly mentioned by scholars of design and architectural studies. Nevertheless, no established criticism emerging from either the architectural or the psychoanalytical disciplines has been formulated.

The lack of a formulated criticism is rather surprising in light of the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Considered the most notable critics of psychoanalysis, they coauthored a harsh attack on psychoanalysis in their seminal books, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1983) and *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1987). In these books, they discuss the dogmatic aspects of psychoanalysis, mainly the primacy of the Oedipus complex as an organizer of the psyche and, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the hierarchized structuring of the psyche. The lack of criticism about psychoanalysis in architecture is even more surprising when one considers that Deleuze's work was extensively celebrated in architecture in the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium.

While *A Thousand Plateaus* was often referred to by architects, architectural historians and theoreticians, his most frequently cited work was probably *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (Deleuze, 1993). For example, in the 2004 re-issue of the journal *Architectural Review* (1994), edited by Greg Lynn and called *Folding in Architecture*, Deleuze's work is addressed by the contributors as a means to reach architectural complexity that interconnects subjectivity and spatiality. In *The Fold*, Deleuze proposes a critique of Cartesian spatiality and subjectivity, and refers to Leibniz's monadology in order to formulate a new ontology of space and the human subject. At the beginning of the 1990s, architects found this text useful for theorizing and philosophizing about the emerging design possibilities provided by the digital media. The failure to address psychoanalysis as a discipline that can provide ways of architectural interpretation and to develop a criticism on its method might be explained by the extensive references to *The Fold*. In this book, Deleuze does not relate to psychoanalysis in any way. His work relates to the human subject and discusses it in relation to matter, soul and mind, but psychoanalysis as a method of deciphering the human subject's psyche is totally ignored. Indeed, Deleuze writes about Leibniz and the Baroque period, when the advent of psychoanalysis was still far off in the future. Yet, Deleuze is a master when it comes to interrelating concepts that are chronologically separated. In *The Fold*, for intellectual and argumentative purposes, psychoanalysis does not exist.

A final word

To conclude, Vidler's and Lavin's separate accounts of psychoanalysis set a basis for what can be defined as the psychoanalysis of architecture. These accounts, as

well as other possible future ones, it is important to stress, are not attempting to create a therapeutic practice, but to culturally psychoanalyze the condition of architecture as both a product and the formulator of the human subject. As such, the psychoanalysis of architecture must be seen in relation to transformations in the cultural conditions of analyzed cases. For instance, even the shift from Vidler's architectural uncanny to Lavin's forms of libido alludes to and is part of changing attitudes in the critical discourse in architecture. Writing in the beginning of the 1990s, Vidler's uncanny emerged from the deconstructivist discussion of absence, void and the non-familiar. In many ways, it concentrated on lack, deficiency, malaise and the "negative." In that respect, Vidler is part of a cultural condition that defines cultural production as the result of social and personal anxieties. Lavin's libido reflects a shift in notions in the architectural discourse as the discussion on desire, creation, energy and the "positive" took precedence. While Lavin frames her discussion in a historical fashion in relation to Neutra's case, her consistent framing of architecture as a result of the libido set the tone for a discourse on the psychoanalysis of architecture as a creative force.

My discussion of Vidler's and Lavin's work and their interrelation by no means tries to suggest that one mode of psychoanalysis in architecture is more advanced than the other. Both scholars propose a model with the utmost rigor, both are contemporary, and both have exerted a seminal influence. My wish in this essay is to outline a mode for psychoanalysis in architecture in a historical fashion, as well as in relation to the history of ideas in psychoanalysis and architecture. I am well aware that there are several additional minor players that referred to psychoanalysis in order to devise their discourses. I chose to concentrate on Vidler and Lavin because of their powerful and influential work. This is not to say, however, that the work on psychoanalysis in architecture is completed. The historicization and theorization of what can be seen as an emerging discipline needs to be expanded. Indeed, more concepts of psychoanalysis in architecture should be developed as specific case studies and as methodologies for the understanding of architecture.

NOTE

¹ I would like to thank my friend, Prof. Helene Furjan of the University of Pennsylvania, for reading initial drafts of this essay and providing insightful comments.

REFERENCES

- Banham, Reyner. (1969). *Architecture and the Well Tempered Environment*. London: Architectural Press.
- Barthes, Roland. (1997). "Semiology and the urban." In Neil Leach (Ed.), *Rethinking Architecture* (pp. 166–171). London and New York: Routledge.
- Bion, Wilfred R. (1970). *Attention and Interpretation: A Scientific Approach to Insight in Psycho-analysis and Groups*. New York: Basic Writings.
- Deleuze, Gilles. (1993). *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (trans. by Tom Conley). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix. (1983). *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- . (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (trans. by Brian Massumi). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Derrida, Jacques. (1972). *Marges de la philosophie*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.
- . (1974). *Of Grammatology* (trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak). Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press.
- . (1980). *La carte postale: de Socrate à Freud et au-delà*. Paris: Éditions Flammarion.
- Eco, Umberto. (1997). "Function and sign: The semiotics of architecture." In Neil Leach (Ed.), *Rethinking Architecture* (pp. 182–201). London and New York: Routledge.
- Freud, Sigmund. (1997 c1919). "The 'uncanny'." *Writing on Art and Architecture* (pp. 193–233). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hays, K. Michael (Ed.). (1998). *Oppositions Reader: Selected Readings from a Journal for Ideas and Criticism in Architecture, 1973–1984*. Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press.
- Hays, K. Michael, Ingraham, Catherine, and Kennedy, Alicia (Eds.). (1986). *Assemblage*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Heidegger, Martin. (1996). *Being and Time* (trans. by Joan Stambaugh). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Johnson, Philip, and Wigley, Mark. (1988). *Deconstructivist Architecture*. New York: Museum of Modern Art.
- Klein, Melanie. (1977). *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works, 1946–1963*. New York: Dell.
- Lavin, Sylvia. (2004). *Form Follows Libido: Architecture and Richard Neutra in Psychoanalytic Culture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lynn, Greg (Ed.). (2004). *Folding in Architecture*. London: Architectural Design, Wiley–Academy Press.

- Neuman, Eran. (2008). "The collapsing of technological performance and the subject's performance." In Yasha Grobman and Eran Neuman (Eds.), *Performatism: Form and Performance in Digital Architecture* (pp. 29–33). Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Museum of Art.
- Vidler, Anthony. (1992). *The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- . (2000). *Warped Spaces: Art, Architecture and the Anxiety of Modern Culture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Winnicott, Donald W. (1931). *Clinical Notes on Disorders of Childhood*. London: William Heinemann.
- Zevi, Bruno. (1957). *Architecture as Space: How to Look at Architecture* (trans. by Milton Gendel). New York: Horizon Press.