

Recoding Europeanness: A comparative study of German-Turks and French-Turks

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ABSTRACT

Based on the findings of a recent quantitative and qualitative research project, "Euro-Turks: A Bridge, or a Breach, between Turkey and the European Union" (Kaya and Kentel, 2005), the main premise of this article is that Euro-Turks largely display a rather different picture from what is stereotypically represented in both Turkey and their countries of settlement. Comparing German-Turks and French-Turks, my aim is to reveal the extent to which Euro-Turks have integrated into the political, economic and cultural spheres of their receiving societies, as well as to understand their orientation to the European Union, Europeanness, their countries of settlement, Turkey and Islam. In light of two recent rival EU projects (politically defined syncretic and prospective Europe, and culturally defined holistic and retrospective Europe), I also argue that Euro-Turks have already created a space for themselves in a politically and economically defined Europe.

Introduction

There is a common belief in Western Europe that Turkish migrants¹ and their children do not integrate into the social, political, economic and cultural life of their countries of settlement. According to this belief, the political motivations of Turks in their receiving countries are primarily shaped by their homeland. However, a wealth of recent evidence and academic work display an alternative picture. Contemporary Turkish migrants and their descendants in the West can no longer simply be considered temporary

1 The term "Turkish migrants", as used here, refers to those who originate from Turkey and to those who have, or used to have, Turkish citizenship.

migrant communities that live with the “myth of return”, or as passive victims of global capitalism who are alienated by the system and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West. They have rather become permanent settlers, active individuals and decision-makers. For instance, lately, there is an emerging middle-class group of Euro-Turks who are involved in many sectors, such as service, tourism, catering, telecommunications and construction.

There is also a lack of awareness, in both homeland and adoptive countries of residence (“hostland”), about the characteristics of Turkish migrants and their children, who have been stereotypically represented in both Turkey and the West. On the one hand, it is still commonly believed in Turkey that Turkish migrants and their descendants in the West are *gurbetçi* (diasporic) with a great orientation towards the homeland who will someday return home. On the other hand, they are also called *Almanci* (German-like), a term that depicts them as rich pork eaters, living very comfortably in the West, losing their Turkishness and becoming increasingly Germanized, Anglicized, Frankified, etc. At the same time, Turkish workers have generally been addressed in the official German discourse as *Gastarbeiter* (guestworker), *Ausländer* (foreigner), and/or *Mitbürger* (co-citizen) – terms which underline their “otherness” and/or “displacement” (Kaya, 2001). The common stereotypical labeling of “Turks” in the West considers them conservative, religious, veiling, poor, nationalist, longing for homeland, unwilling to integrate and violent. Findings of a recent study by this author and Ferhat Kentel (2005), however, reveal that Euro-Turks are highly diversified and have very little in common with the *Almanci*, “guestworker” or “foreigner” stereotypes of the past. The research sheds light on those invisible Euro-Turks who somehow contradict the stereotypical categorization of “Turks” visible in the public space based on their outward appearance and dress. It also challenges the common Western belief that Turks do not integrate into their country of settlement and that Turkish Islam is incompatible with the Western way of life. It is my claim that Euro-Turks do not pose a challenge to the political, economic and cultural spheres of life in the European Union. For the inclination of migrants to rely on their ethnicity, nationality, religiosity, identity and authenticity in the diasporan context does not necessarily challenge the security of the majority society; it may equally refer to a quest for justice and fairness in their countries of settlement (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2002).²

The research on which this article is based (Kaya and Kentel, 2005) was conducted between September 2003 and March 2004 in Germany and France, and included both qualitative (indepth interviews and focus group discussions) and quantitative methods

2 Will Kymlicka (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2002) made this classification to distinguish the ways in which minority group demands are identified in Western and Eastern Europe. He claims that Western European democracies usually define minority claims as a quest for justice and fairness, while Eastern European states see such claims as a threat to their national security.

(1065 structured interviews in Germany and 600 in France, each with 90 questions). The structured interviews were carried out in November 2003 by two local public poll companies in Germany and France, with the aid of Turkish-speaking university students fluent in German or French. Interviews were conducted in one of three languages (Turkish, German or French), depending upon the preference of the interviewee (21 percent of the interviews held among the German-Turks were conducted in German, and 31 percent among the French-Turks were in French).

Following a general outline of the Turks' migration processes to each country and the integration policies of each receiving society, I will highlight two antithetical projects: cultural Europe and political Europe. It is within this context that I discuss current perspectives of Euro-Turks on the EU and on Europeaness, as well as new identities bridging their homeland and hostland.

Migratory process in Germany: From *Gastarbeiter* to limited hyphenated citizenship

Migration into post-war Germany began as the result of labor recruitment to mitigate shortages in specific industries. Between 1955 and 1968, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) concluded intergovernmental contracts with eight Mediterranean countries: first Italy (1955), then Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961 and 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). The German Federal Labor Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit* or BFA) set up recruitment offices in the countries concerned. Employers seeking workers had to apply to the BFA and pay a fee. The BFA then selected suitable workers, tested their work skills, gave them medical checkups and screened police and political records. Migrants were recruited at first for agriculture and construction, and later for all branches of industry, where they generally had low-skilled manual jobs (Castles and Kosack, 1973). Guest-worker programs were designed to solve immediate labor shortages in Germany by recruiting workers on temporary, short-term residence and work permits (Castles et al., 1984).

The Turkish population in the FRG rose from 6,700 in 1961 to 605,000 in 1973. In the early stages, Turkish migrants were mainly men between the ages of 20 and 39, relatively skilled and educated in comparison to the average working population in Turkey, and from the economically more developed regions of the country (Abadan-Unat, 1976; Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz, 1986; Martin, 1991); rural migrants at that time made up just 17.2% of this population. In the second half of the 1960s, however, recruitment primarily consisted of rural workers (Gökdere, 1978). Berlin was relatively late in recruiting Turkish workers, and as the textile and electronics sectors demanded cheap female labor, it was the women who first migrated there in 1964. Turkish workers who migrated to Berlin by 1973 were primarily from the eastern provinces and from economically less-developed regions of Turkey. There has been a continual increase in

the non-German population throughout the post-war period, with the exception of a short period in which the entry of non-EC workers was banned (November 1973) by the German government due to the oil crisis, consequent economic stagnation and political considerations. Since 1973, the Turkish migrant population has tended to be a more general population migrating for reasons of family reunification and political asylum rather than labor pursuits per se.

The Federal Republic of Germany's constitution, the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), recognizes two categories of rights: general and reserved. General rights apply to all individuals in the FRG and include freedom of expression, liberty of person and freedom of conscience (Arts. 2-5). Reserved rights are restricted to German citizens, and include the right of peaceable assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of association and freedom of occupation (Arts. 8-9, 11-12). The Basic Law does not prescribe how citizenship is recognized or conferred, but the criteria are based first and foremost on ethnic nationality. The rules governing the acquisition of citizenship, as defined by Article 116 of the Basic Law, the preamble to the Basic Law, and the 1913 Imperial and State Citizenship Law (*Reichs – und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*), provide that citizenship is passed by descent from parent to child. The Imperial Naturalization Law of 1913 was designed to make the acquisition of German citizenship difficult for aliens out of fear that the Reich was being invaded by immigrants from the East, especially Poles and Jews. At the same time, the law sharply reduced the barriers to the repatriation of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) from outside the *Reich* (Brubaker, 1992:114-119; Klusmeyer 1993:84; Marshall 1992).

The claim for naturalization has always been difficult for non-EU “foreigners” in the FRG, and has required repudiation of the citizenship of the country of origin. Non-EU “foreigners” have usually been denied the right to dual citizenship; even the children of migrants born and raised in Germany could not automatically receive the rights of citizenship until January 2000. Those “foreigners” who are willing to renounce their previous citizenship can be naturalized only after living in Germany for at least 15 years. In contrast, the *Volksdeutschen* (ethnic Germans defined by Article 116 of the Basic Law) – primarily Poles and Russians who can prove German ancestry – have a constitutional right to naturalization.

However, the current German government, the Red-Green coalition of the Social Democrats and the Greens, recently established two mechanisms that, for the first time, endow migrants with the right to acquire citizenship. According to the new *Ausländergesetz* (1991) and the *Gesetz zur Änderung Asylverfahrens, Ausländer- und staatsangehörigkeitsrechtlicher Vorschriften* (1993), two groups of *Ausländer* have been legally entitled to naturalization (paragraphs 85 and 86 of the *Ausländergesetz*). Paragraph 85 declares that “foreigners” between the ages of 16 and 23, who have resided in Germany for more than eight years, attended a school in Germany for at least six years and have not been convicted of serious offenses, have the right to be naturalized. Moreover, paragraph 86 extends that same right to those “migrants” who

have resided in Germany for at least 15 years and possess a residence permit. The absence of a conviction for a serious criminal offense and the financial independence of the applicant are also crucial for the acquisition of citizenship according to this paragraph.

Non-EU immigrants, or resident aliens, have mostly been given social and civil rights, but not political rights. The legal barriers denying political participation laid the foundation for Turkish immigrants in Germany to organize themselves politically along collective ethnic and religious lines. In response to German insistence on the exclusionary *Ausländerstatus*, Turkish migrant communities have tended to develop strong ethnic structures and maintain ethnic boundaries. The lack of political participation and representation in the receiving country made them direct their political activity towards their country of origin. In fact, this home-oriented participation has received encouragement from Turkey, which has set up networks of consular services and other official organizations (religious, educational and commercial). Homeland opposition parties and movements have also forged an organizational presence in Germany.

A new law, in force since January 1, 2000, partially alters the principle of descent (*jus sanguinis*), which was heretofore the country's traditional basis for granting citizenship. As a result, it is now also possible to acquire German citizenship as a result of being born in Germany (*jus soli*). According to the law, children born in Germany to foreign nationals will receive German citizenship at birth if one of their parents has resided lawfully in Germany for at least eight years and holds entitlement to residence or has an unlimited residence permit for at least three years. The law also created a transitional arrangement for children up to the age of 10 who had been born in Germany before the law went into effect. Accordingly, those children could be automatically naturalized without a waiting period if they applied within one year. In most cases, they would also acquire their parents' citizenship under the principle of descent. Such children have to decide, within the five years between their eighteenth and twenty third birthdays, whether they want to retain their German citizenship or opt for their other nationality.

The number of "foreigners" applying for naturalization has increased remarkably since the introduction of the new citizenship laws, rising from 1999 to 2000 by about 30 percent. According to data provided by the *Länder* governments, 186,700 legally defined foreigners were granted German citizenship in the course of 2000, compared to 143,267 in 1999. Subsequently, a total of 178,100 "foreigners" were naturalized in 2001, a decline of 4.6 percent from 2000. In contrast to the increased naturalization among foreigners in general, the rate for Turks decreased from 1999 to 2000 by about 20 percent. This trend continued in 2001, with a decrease of 9 percent (see Table 1).

Table 1. Naturalization of the German-Turkish population

Year	Number of Naturalizations	Year	Number of Naturalizations
1972-1979	2,219	1996	46,294
1980-1989	10,361	1997	42,240
1990	2,034	1998	59,664
1991	3,529	1999	103,900
1992	7,377	2000	82,800
1993	12,915	2001	75,600
1994	19,590	2002	64,631
1995	31,578	2003	56,244
		Total	625,981

Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany, Weisbaden, 2004.

The figures in the table raise two important questions: Why the decline in the number of naturalizations of people of Turkish descent from 2000 to 2001, and, more surprisingly, why the significant drop in 2000 after the rise between 1998 and 1999? The former trend is relatively easy to explain: the rule that allowed children up to the age of 10 born prior to 2000 to be naturalized automatically was no longer in effect in 2001.

The second trend is more complex and requires further inquiry, as I have no substantial evidence to support my hypotheses. Nevertheless, I shall briefly touch upon this point, offering several possible reasons. Firstly, German-Turks may have been satisfied with “denizenship” status, which gives them civil, social and cultural rights, but not political rights. Thus, they felt no need to seek naturalization. Secondly, German-Turks may have expected a more democratic citizenship law to be put into effect, one that did not place limitations on dual citizenship. Perhaps when those expectations were not met, they did not see any benefit in acquiring German citizenship. A third possible reason is that Turks, who mostly reside in urban areas, preferred to ignore the new nationality law, which required a greater bureaucratic workload in city-states such as Berlin. This may have had a discouraging effect on those German-Turks already in the process of naturalization. A fourth reason may be that there is already a decline in the voting habits of German-Turks, who do not have the right to vote in Turkish general elections. The right to vote in their own residential areas is a great issue for Turkish citizens living abroad.

Finally, a last, but not least, explanation is the process of “globalization from below” (Brecher et al., 1993), which sets up the pillars of modern diasporic identity (Clifford, 1997; Gilroy, 1995; Hall, 1994; Kaya, 2001). The wide networks of communication and transportation between Germany and Turkey, as well as the expansion of economic, cultural and political networks between homeland and hostland, play a crucial role in

the formation and maintenance of a diasporic identity among transnational communities. The modern circuitry connects the diasporic subjects both to the homeland and to the rest of the world. This is why it becomes much easier for German-Turks to live on “both banks of the river” at the same time. This constitutive entanglement has become characteristic of modern diaspora networks. In the context of the diasporic condition, “globalization from below” refers to the enhancement of access – for transnational migrants and their descendants – to those social, cultural, political and economic mechanisms enabling them to transcend the exclusionary conditions imposed upon them by the German nation-state. To put it differently, a diasporic identity symbolically enables diasporic subjects to overcome the limitations and oppression of the country of settlement. In this context, the traditional national citizenship discourse loses its importance and legitimacy for contemporary diasporic subjects. Therefore, this obsolete rhetoric needs to be replaced with new forms of citizenship, such as dual citizenship, multiple citizenship, post-national citizenship, transnational citizenship, or diasporic citizenship.

The question here is whether the new laws leave room for such progressive forms of citizenship in Germany. The new citizenship laws do permit the descendants of Turkish migrants to acquire dual citizenship, at least for a period of time. The present legal reforms equip “foreigners” born in Germany with the capacity to go beyond their previously defined “denizen” status. They can thus enjoy political rights as well as civic, social, cultural and environmental rights. Hence, the present German citizenship laws open up new space for the introduction of a kind of limited “hyphenated” citizenship for non-European “foreigners”, including the Turkish population. The partial introduction of the principle of *jus soli* clearly indicates that the definition of Germanness is no longer limited to ethnic descent. It also suggests that ethnically non-German and non-European members of the Federal Republic can be incorporated into the political sphere through civic channels. In a way, these legal changes reflect the transformation of the culturally defined national project towards a rather Habermasian “post-national society” project, which requires the political recognition of newcomers.³ In other words, the new laws partially distance one from the hegemony of the once essential ethnic identities such as “German”, “Turkish”, “Kurdish”, “Iranian”, etc. They hold the potential of opening the way for the construction of hyphenated civic identities, such as “German-Turkish” (in the Turkish language, this literally means a Turk from Germany, *Almanyalı Türk*), “German-Kurdish” or “German-Iranian”.

3 Jürgen Habermas (1999) uses “post-national society” to refer to a form of multicultural, multireligious, and multinational society, whose principal allegiance is to the collectively designed constitution. Habermas prefers the term “constitutional patriotism” to describe the principal condition of peaceful coexistence of ethnic, religious and cultural differences.

Migratory process in France: The rise of anti-immigrant nationalist discourse

Like Germany, France experienced labor shortages in the aftermath of World War II. In response, the country became an active recruiter of migrant workers from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s. However, the post-war discourse of migration revolved only partly around the need for labor; another part revolved around the need for population growth in the face of a declining birth rate. By separating residence permits from work permits, the government opened the door to jobseekers who had not yet been hired and to families. This policy encouraged immigrants to view themselves as permanent settlers rather than laborer sojourners (Kivisto, 2002:172).

Although no ethnic quotas were laid down, French governments sought as much as possible to encourage European rather than African or Asian immigrants. Nonetheless, Algerians arrived in the highest numbers. Initially, French nationals living in Algeria, commonly known as *Pieds-noirs* , fled to France. They were later followed by the *harkis* , Algerians who had fought on the side of the French during the struggle for independence. After the French defeat, many of these French allies were executed by the Algerian nationalists, but many managed to flee to the mainland (Kivisto, 2002). Shortly after the independence of Algeria, both states signed an agreement to recruit further labor, resulting in the concentration of Algerians in Paris, Lyon and Marseille. Spaniards, Italians, Moroccans, Tunisians and Turks followed the Algerians in increasingly smaller numbers. Table 2 shows a recent breakdown of the Muslim population in France.

Table 2. National origins of the Muslim population in France (2000)

Country of Origin	Population	Country of Origin	Population
Algeria	1,550,000	Converts	40,000
Morocco	1,000,000	Asylum Applicants /Illegal	350,000
Tunisia	350,000	Asians	100,000
Black Africa	250,000	Other	100,000
Turkey	315,000		
Total			4,155,000

Source: "l'Islam dans la République", Haut Conseil à l'intégration, Nov. 2000:26.

Note: Best estimates of an interior ministry source, these figures are widely seen to undercount the number of illegals.

France signed a recruitment treaty with Turkey in 1966. The first Turkish workers to migrate to France were actually those who had applied to the Turkish Employment Office (*İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu*) to go to Germany (Firat, 2003:76; Kastoryano, 1986:165). As the German labor market was saturated by the Turkish labor force, some

of the Turkish applicants had the opportunity to go to France after the recruitment treaty was in force. However, those workers always had the expectation to move to Germany. This stage of migration from Turkey is known as *anonymous migration*. It was followed by *nominal migration*, when the workers were directly recruited to France to meet specific needs (Strasburger, 1995). Nominal migration was rather more popular in France than in Germany, and it has led to the rise of chain migration. This inevitably resulted in intensified migration from certain ethnic and geographical groups.

Although the recruitment process in France was terminated by the Conservative government of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1974, migration from Turkey lingered on through family reunification and illegal overstay of tourists. Migration continues today in the form of marital partners "imported" from Turkey and asylum seeking in France. The Conservative government also tried to reduce the number of foreigners in the nation via a campaign of voluntary repatriation that involved monetary inducements to leave. While it was primarily directed at non-EU nations, in fact very few Third World immigrants took up the offer. It was the Spanish and Portuguese who complied with the offer to return to their countries, in which democratic regimes were back in place. The result of these measures taken together was that, for the last quarter of the twentieth century, the size of the foreign population remained steady (Kivisto, 2002).

The French saw themselves as an assimilationist nation, but they were unprepared for the presence of large numbers of people of color and large numbers of Muslims. Alec Hargreaves (1995:26-27) summarized the situation:

The seeming invisibility of past generations of immigrants and of those who are today descended from them is often regarded as proof of the success with which they have been incorporated into French society. Immigrants who have settled in France during the post-war period, and more particularly those who have come to the fore during the past twenty years, are often felt to threaten this tradition. It is widely claimed that people of Third World origins are much harder to "integrate" than Europeans. Far from disappearing without a trace, they have actually increased in visibility at a time when successive governments have been claiming that immigration is at an end... the fear is that immigration is leading remorselessly to the formation of permanently distinct minorities within French society.

For a century France has defined second-generation immigrants as citizens. This practice was uncontested until the mid-1980s, when *jus soli* came under sharp attack from the far Right. "*Etre Français, cela mérite*" (to be French, you have to deserve it), proclaimed Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front. Under pressure from the National Front, the center Right parties took up the theme during the 1986 legislative campaign, proposing in their joint platform to denounce automatic acquisition of French citizenship. Second-generation immigrants no longer would become French *jus soli*; they would have to request French nationality expressly, and that request would have to be accepted

by the state. The new government of Jacques Chirac proposed to limit the *jus soli* principle as far as immigrants were concerned, but the proposal provoked strong opposition, and eventually it was withdrawn from the legislative agenda. The commission set up to inquire into the issue even came up with the idea of enlarging access to French citizenship rather than restricting it (Brubaker, 1992:138).

French citizenship law contains two provisions embodying the principle of *jus soli*: Article 23, granting citizenship at birth to third-generation immigrants, and Article 44, affording citizenship at age 18 to second-generation immigrants who were born in France and have resided there since age 13, provided that they have not opted out of French citizenship or been convicted of certain crimes. French law also permits dual citizenship. However, the citizenship law has been criticized lately by the nationalists for turning foreigners into French citizens on paper without making sure that they are "French at heart" (*Français de coeur*). Nationalist critiques of the *jus soli* principle have become even stronger since the early 1990s, with increased fears of so-called Islamic fundamentalism.

A comparative field study by sociologist Michèle Tribalat (1996, 2002), of Algerian, Moroccan, Spanish, Portuguese, Southeast Asian, and Turkish migrants in France, led her to the striking conclusion that Turks are an exception. According to her, French-Turk migrants have been the group most resistant to integration and assimilation. They prefer not to speak French at home, even though they are rather competent in the language; they set up parallel communities to the majority society in their own ethnic enclaves; they are more oriented to religiosity than the other Muslim communities; they prefer not to intermarry with the French; and they are less inclined to prioritize education (Tribalat, 2002).

Some of these conclusions, however, seem to be over-generalizations. In particular, her interpretation of the lack of intermarriage between French and French-Turks needs to be challenged. Marrying someone from Turkey certainly points to the willingness of migrant families to remain in touch with Turkey, as well to the protection of cultural values, such as honor. Honor is not only an individual value, but also something social and communal. Cultural values such as honor become a source of distinction and difference in a remote land where the diasporic individual encounters the other. Thus, honor and resistance to intermarriage could indeed constitute a counter-attack on assimilation, especially in France; marrying someone from Turkey functions not only as a tool for keeping the culture intact, but also as a means of sustaining immigration (Bozarslan, 1996). However, imported brides and grooms may also provide migrants with the opportunity to create strong families. Although Claire Autant and Véronique Manry (1998:73) claim that French-Turkish women are reluctant when their parents decide to marry them to a man from Turkey, in fact, doing so may provide them with some advantages, such as the groom's becoming dependent on his bride due to a lack of competence in the French language and culture, as well as a loosening of parental authority from both sides. Gaby Strasburger (2004) has also claimed that the issue of

parental coercion is only relevant to a certain degree among Euro-Turks; apart from exceptional cases, young people mainly decide to marry someone from their country of origin of their own free will.

Policies of citizenship in comparison: Integration/assimilation

German and French forms of statecraft are significantly different. The French form springs from the Enlightenment tradition, based on the *material civilizational idea*, which sought to impose Western universalist ideals on remote lands. This tradition was colonial in the sense that it was determined to constitute a homogenous and monolithic world political culture based on the Western values of fraternity, liberty and equality. In contrast, the German form of statecraft comes from the anti-Enlightenment idea of *Aufklärung*, which emphasizes the romantic notion of perceiving all cultures as equal to each other. Thus, there are two alternative models of statecraft: the French *civilizationist project*, tracing its roots back to such Enlightenment philosophers as Rousseau and Montesquieu, and the German *culturalist project*, tracing its roots back to Herder. This distinction is a great aid in understanding and comparing the nationhood, citizenship, immigration, integration and assimilation regimes of both countries. Roger Brubaker's work, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, is largely based on such a distinction:

If the French understanding of nationhood has been *state-centered* and *assimilationist*, the German understanding has been *Volk-centered* and *differentialist*. Since national feeling developed before the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not originally political, nor was it linked to the abstract idea of citizenship. This prepolitical German nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial community – as an irreducibly particular *Volksgemeinschaft*. On this understanding, nationhood is an ethnocultural, not a political fact (1992:1).

According to Brubaker, comparisons between the two countries' understandings of nationhood go back to the early 19th century; they were first formulated by German intellectuals who sought to distance themselves from the allegedly shallow rationalism and cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and the French revolution through a historicist celebration of cultural pluralism. Brubaker also states that French and German traditions of citizenship and nationhood may be stigmatized by conceptual dualities such as: universalism and particularism, cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism, Enlightenment rationalism and Romantic irrationalism, assimilationist and differentialist, civilizational and cultural, political and ethnocultural. When it comes to

migrants, he praises the French politics of citizenship due to its universalist and inclusive nature which easily molds migrants into citizens. He implicitly condemns German politics of citizenship, as it has a particularist and exclusive nature, making settlers – but not citizens – of migrants.

However, things have changed dramatically since Brubaker wrote his ground-breaking piece. Those countries which were known to have inclusive, democratic and universalist incorporation regimes vis-à-vis migrants have turned out to be more restrictive and exclusive. England, the U.S., Ireland and Holland are some examples, adopting a restrictive citizenship regime and abandoning the *jus soli* principle for granting citizenship to migrants. On the other hand, Germany, though known as differentialist, particularist, culturalist, ethnonationalist and exclusive in terms of citizenship policies, has become more democratic and inclusive since 2000. The data gathered in the current research indicate that Brubaker's statements concerning the citizenship regimes of the two countries are no longer pertinent.

Dominant discourses of multiculturalism, cultural diversity and pluralism in Germany have recently led German-Turks to represent themselves with their own cultural identities in the public space. Such popular discourses, reinforced by the Social Democratic and Green policies, have also resulted in the political, economic and cultural integration of German-Turks into all spheres of life. The rising number of parliamentarians of Turkish origin in local, national and European Parliaments indicates that German-Turks politically integrate; the visibility of German-Turks in the cultural sphere also implies that Turks culturally integrate; and the rising amount of investment in the domestic economy by the German-Turks proves that Turks economically integrate. These facts contradict the stereotypical belief in Germany that Turks do not integrate. Their integration may be a result of the culturally differentialist features of incorporation policies in Germany, or of the existence of the large Turkish population in the country. However, it is likely that it is the Social Democrat-Green coalition government, in power since 1998, that has had the greatest impact in democratizing immigration and integration policies in a way that has changed Germany from a *segregationist* into an *integrationist* country.

The French form of the republican ideal of integration is said to resemble assimilation: a citizenship model to assimilate those arriving into the French civilizational project through language, *laïcité*, modernism, state-centrism, Western-centric universalism and rationalism. While cultural diversity is usually undermined, citizenship is underlined. Thus, politically defined citizenship has always taken a primary place over culture-specific nationality. The dominance of citizenship over nationality, of political over ethnocultural conceptions of nationhood, is perhaps best expressed in Tallien's remark in the spring of 1795: "the only foreigners in France are bad citizens" (cited in Azimi, 1988:702). However, civilizational discourse has always been implicitly embedded in the French republican model. Integration refers to the acculturation of foreigners, and acculturation in this respect means Franco-conformity. According to Tribalat (2003),

the major weakness of the “French Melting Pot” resides in its difficulty in producing professional and social mobility, a phenomenon that involves the whole of society, but which is more difficult for populations of foreign origin. Around 80% of young people with immigrant roots aged 20-29 are children of laborers, i.e., almost twice that of the young native French.

Alternative projects of Europe: A holistic or a syncretic Europe?

Present regimes of migrant incorporation in France and Germany display essential differences. France demonstrates a universalist, civilizational and assimilationist discourse with regard to the integration of migrants, while Germany displays a particularist, culturalist and multiculturalist discourse. This distinction is reflected in how each government perceives the European Union, which actually corresponds to the EU's two major definitions of Europeaness at present. The first is that proposed by the Conservatives, who define Europeaness as a static, retrospective, holistic, essentialist and culturally prescribed entity.⁴ The second is that proposed by the Social Democrats, Liberals, Socialists and Greens, which emphasizes the understanding that “Europe” is a fluid, ongoing, dynamic, prospective, syncretic and nonessentialist process of becoming. While the first definition highlights a *cultural project*, the latter definition welcomes a *political project* embracing cultural and religious differences, including Islam. This must be one of the explanations as to why the inclusive and responsible acts of the Social Democrats and Greens in Germany and France are so well received by German-Turks.

The Conservative *holistic idea* aims to build a culturally prescribed Europe based on Christian mythology, shared meanings and values, historical myths and memories, the Ancient Greek and/or Roman legacy, homogeneity and heterophobia (Table 3). Holistic Europe does not intend to include any other culture or religion outside of this European/Christian legacy. Hence, neither Turkey nor Islam has a place in this project. This is why Angela Merkel (CDU leader in Germany) and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (President of the EU Convention) and several other leaders in the wider Union (Poland, Slovakia) both implicitly and explicitly advocate including an article in the EU Constitution regarding the Christian roots of the Union. On the other hand, the

4 Anthropologically speaking, there are two principal notions of culture: holistic and syncretic. The former considers culture a highly integrated and grasped static “whole”. This is the dominant paradigm of classical modernity, of which territoriality and totality were the main characteristics. The latter notion is the one which is most obviously affected by increasing interconnectedness in space. This syncretic notion of culture has been proposed by contemporary scholars to demonstrate that cultures emerge as a result of mixing beyond political and geographical territories (Kaya, 2001:33).

progressive *syncretic idea* proposes a politically dynamic Europe based on cultural diversity, dialogue, heterogeneity and heterophilia. The advocates of a syncretic Europe promote coexistence with Turkey and Islam, and underline that the EU is, by origin, a peace project. Joscka Fischer, Michel Rocard and Gerhard Schröder are some of the leaders emphasizing the secular character of the EU. Surprisingly enough, the cultural Europe project complies with the latest republican idea of “unity-over-diversity” in a way that denies heterogeneity and rejects the potential of the European Project as a peace project. In contrast, the political Europe project goes along with the idea of “unity-in-diversity”, aiming to construct a meta-European identity that embraces cultural and religious differences. Hence, the perspectives of Euro-Turks on the EU should be assessed in line with these two antithetical paradigms on Europe. Indeed, the data gathered in the current study indicate that the Euro-Turks favor the progressive ideal of a political Europe embracing diversity.

Table 3. Alternate projects for Europe

Syncretic Europe		Holistic Europe	
<i>Dynamic</i>	Syncretic culture	<i>Static</i>	Holistic culture
<i>Secular</i>	Post-civilizational	<i>Religious</i>	Civilizational
<i>Societal</i>	Prospective	<i>Communal</i>	Retrospective
<i>Postnational</i>	Non-essentialist	<i>Multinational</i>	Essentialist
<i>Economic</i>	Heterophilia	<i>Economic</i>	Heterophobia
<i>Political</i>	Political geography	<i>Cultural</i>	Physical geography

Both the qualitative and quantitative data gathered in our research suggest that Euro-Turks lack a clearcut understanding of Europeanness. However, the same can be said for the receiving societies: a deep-rooted sense of Europeanness does not exist among the majority of the public either; rather, an identity is gradually being constructed by the political elite of the EU through education, European citizenship and a common history and future. The European Union has clearly displayed stronger political unity since the Tindemans Report, submitted to the European Council at the end of December 1975, prompted member states to form a unified political entity with its own flag, anthem, myths, memories, peoples, regions and rights and duties granted to its EU citizens.⁵

⁵ Leo Tindemans was Belgian Prime Minister at the time. For a detailed account of the report, see Tindemans (1975); see also Maas (2004).

The definition of Europeanness is also dependent on class differences among the Euro-Turks. Definitions given by members of the working class usually accord with the dominant discourse in Turkey. They include such notions as values, democracy, equality, human rights and modernization. To them, “Europeanness” signifies a teleological project emphasizing constant progress with a target to be reached. This is also true of first- and second-generation middle-class Euro-Turks. In contrast, third- and fourth-generation members of the middle class, most of whom were born in the country of settlement, state that they are not concerned with being defined as “European”, as they are already experiencing such an identity without the need to reach any prospective target. They have developed a set of cosmopolitan and hyphenated identities, underlining difference, diversity and citizenship (Figure 1). Constructing such cosmopolitan identities, young generations of Turkish origin certainly comply with the newly emerging syncretic Europe.

Figure 1: Which identification suits you most?




Figure 1 shows that Euro-Turks themselves confirm their hyphenated identities (Euro-Turks): around 60% of German-Turks define themselves as either Turkish-European (50%) or European-Turkish (10%). The ratio in France is 59% (Turkish-European) and 10% (European-Turkish). Only 37% of German-Turks and 24% of French-Turks define themselves as Turkish. These figures differ from those of Hakan Yılmaz (2004) of Bosphorus University.

Additional indications that the Euro-Turks have recently developed hyphenated identities, confirming the syncretic character of contemporary Europe, can be found in the number who either have EU citizenship or are planning to apply (around 60% in Germany and 74% in France). These high numbers indicate that Euro-Turks are open to integration and political participation. The latest statistics indicate that the number

of naturalized German-Turks has increased twofold since 2000, when the new citizenship law went into effect. The number of German-Turks with German citizenship has risen from around 350,000 prior to 2000 to more than 700,000. The results of the new German citizenship law signify that migrants can be quite receptive to and incorporatist vis-à-vis democratic and inclusive political and legal changes.

Additionally, Euro-Turks no longer perceive their homeland as a place of eventual return. Instead, both Turkey and Germany/France hold various advantages and disadvantages for them. When asked, they are quite objective in stating which place is better for what issue, be it human rights, democracy, education, tolerance, values or job opportunities. Approximately 49% of German-Turks feel more of an affiliation with Turkey, while 22% are affiliated with Germany (i.e., are assimilated); in France, the parallel percentages are 36% and 25%. While the reasons underlying the low affiliation of German-Turks with Germany may be manifold, the economic crisis seems to be one of the main ones. Affiliation with the homeland, on the other hand, may result from either structural outsiderism, as in the German case, or assimilationist integration, as in the French case. Both outsiderism and assimilation may lead to the construction of communal networks with defensive, nationalist, religious, laicist, Kemalist and even Kurdish undertones. The percentage of those who affiliate equally with both countries is remarkably high: 27% in Germany and 36% in France. These groups, which tend to come from those born in the country of settlement, seem to constitute the bridge between Turkey and the European Union, as they have constructed more reflexive, active, transnational, postnational, universalist and cosmopolitan identities.

Poverty: Watch out!

From an economic perspective, both qualitative and quantitative data show that Euro-Turks are no longer solely manual workers working in low-skilled jobs, lacking any agency to represent them in the public space. Most Euro-Turks no longer need the tutelage of their German/French mentors to represent them in the public space; rather, they are being represented by their own organic intellectuals – politicians, artists, artisans, businessmen, poets, novelists, bureaucrats, journalists, singers and teachers. This has, of course, something to do with the fact that Turks are socially mobilizing upward, and now have a large number of middle-class people in the communities.

However, there is also a parallel phenomenon in the rising numbers of unemployed who have no formal job. A number of these have the right to benefit from the welfare system by receiving unemployment benefits from the state, but an increasing number cannot avail themselves of state aid, as they were never in a position to contribute to the welfare system owing to their chronic unemployment. Unemployment is, of course, an outcome of the global recession. Those unemployed Euro-Turks, whom one easily

comes across in ethnically Turkish enclaves like Kreuzberg (Berlin), Keupstrasse (Köln) and Villier le Bel (Paris), are largely opposed to Turkey's candidacy to the EU. Euro-Turks dwelling in those segregated ethnic enclaves are truly disadvantaged. The world not only continues to be segregated for them, but in some cases there is evidence of greater levels of segregation than in the past, leading some researchers to refer to this as "hypersegregation" (Massey and Denton, 1993). Inner-city Turks in such neighborhoods attend segregated schools, worship in their own mosques, shop in segregated stores, generate their niche economies, and so forth. The exodus of the Turkish middle class from inner cities to new neighborhoods has left behind only the poorest of the poor in communities increasingly disconnected from the larger urban economy and bereft of the institutional support that once helped ghetto dwellers survive in a hostile world. These are communities hard hit by deindustrialization, where residents are forced to cope with the consequences of what happens to neighborhoods when work disappears (Kivisto, 2002). The most appropriate term for describing the worldview of those "hypersegregated people" is *nihilism*.

Unemployed Euro-Turks (22% in Germany and 11% in France) tend to express their distrust in both Turkish and German/French states, as neither are capable of providing them with better opportunities to survive. Their damaged solidarity with both homeland and hostland has been replaced by alternative formations, such as community associations, religious organizations (predominantly *Milli Görüş*, *Alevi Cemevis*), fellowship organizations, culture, ethnicity and mosques. Although the history of ethnic/cultural/religious associations in Germany goes back to the 1960s, it was only in the 1980s that the Mitterand government enacted a number of measures which moved in a more pluralistic direction. Among these was a relaxation of the Law of 1901 governing clubs and societies, one consequence of which was the emergence of a large number of ethnically and culturally specific associations. Many mosques were then founded in France (Grillo, 1998:185). However, the crises and corruption faced by the religious organizations and the failure of other ethnic – or religious-based associations to meet their demands have resulted in the decline of such formations. As a result, these people have come to the conclusion that there is nothing to believe in but themselves. This is what we call a proletarianization process, resulting in the rise of nihilist tendencies in a way that belittles the value of politics.

Conclusion

As our research (Kaya and Kentel, 2005) has shown, Euro-Turks have constructed *reflexive* identities in a way that contributes to the redefinition of Europeanness, Germanness and Frenchness. Individually and collectively, through new forms of communitarianism, they have constructed their identities in interaction with the majority societies, demonstrating that Europeanness is not a prescribed identity, but an ongoing

process of being and becoming. Hence, we can point to three major groupings of Euro-Turks emerging in the migratory process: bridging, breaching and assimilated.

Bridging groups (more than 40%) consist of:

- those who are equally affiliated with homeland and hostland, usually young generations with cosmopolitan and syncretic cultural identities (multilingual);
- those who are also affiliated with both homeland and hostland and who construct a dynamic transnational space combining Turkey and Germany/France, such as the Euro-Muslims (e.g. Cojepiennes in France, and MUSIAD in Germany); and
- those who have hyphenated and multiple identities without focusing on any particular political, religious, ethnic or racial identity.

Breaching groups (around 40%) are made up of those who still have a strong orientation to the homeland, including extreme religious, nationalist and laicist persons/groups.

Assimilated groups (around 20%) are usually more prosperous, although there are also some groups of lower income levels who felt ethnically, religiously and/or politically excluded in Turkey.

In sum, we have found that there are a substantial number of migrants of Turkish origin in the West that do not fit into the category of stereotypical “Turk”. Moreover, the majority of Euro-Turks have become politically, socially, economically and culturally integrated active agents in their countries of settlement. Around 40% have generated a form of life embracing both homeland and hostland in a manner that forms a bridge between the two; and an additional 20% have actually assimilated into the receiving society.

There are several additional findings of our study that are important to summarize. First, ethnic/religious/cultural revival among the Euro-Turks can be interpreted as a quest for justice and fairness rather than a security challenge. It is commonly known that Western European states, generally speaking, have the tendency to regard Islam as a threat to their national security. Instead, the research suggests that orientation to Islam among the Euro-Turks can also be regarded as a quest for justice and fairness. Euro-Turks do not pose a threat to the political and social systems of their countries of settlement, but rather are willing to incorporate themselves into that system. This finding suggests that the EU states should replace their security discourse with a justice discourse in their responses to minority claims.

Second, by lumping migration together with drug trafficking, human trafficking, international criminality and terrorism, Western states tend to promote the fear of migration and of “others”. Securitization of migration has become a vital issue since 11/9. States seem to employ the discourse of securitization as a political technique with a capacity to integrate a society politically by staging a credible existential threat

in the form of an internal, or even an external, enemy. The popularity of the claim that the EU will encounter an “influx” of migration from Turkey when it joins the Union illustrates such a politically and socially constructed fear. It should not be forgotten that the same fear had also been raised when Spain, Portugal and Greece joined the Union; yet, what happened in those cases was the reverse. In fact, 30% of Euro-Turks reported that they would consider returning to Turkey after a prospective membership. The rise of the number of the EU citizens buying immovable properties in Turkey is another issue to be taken into consideration. Turkey has lately become an attractive destination for EU citizens to live in for good.

Third, Germany has a culturalist and differentialist incorporation regime, whereas France has a universalist and assimilationist one. German incorporation policies vis-à-vis migrants have so far been culturalist and communitarian. Interpretation of culturalist discourse by the Conservatives (CDU-CSU) in Germany has brought about segregationist *Gastarbeiter* policies imprisoning migrants into ghettos or colonies. However, a reading of the same culturalist discourse by the Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens (*Grünen*) in recent years has resulted in a more integrationist and liberal set of policies. French universalism and republicanism, on the other hand, has recently been accused of being assimilationist by the French-Turks.

Fourth, communitarianism in contemporary Germany seems to provide German-Turks with a more liberal ground whereby they can politically, socially, culturally and economically integrate into the mainstream society. The data gathered by the structured interviews indicate that German-Turks, generally speaking, are more communitarian, religious and conservative than French-Turks. They also seem to be less in favor of integration, as they are content with their ethnic enclaves, religious archipelagos and traditional solidarity networks. However, other findings in the research indicate the contrary. Although, French-Turks seem to engage more in the modern way of life, orienting themselves to integration, the French language, secularism, laicism and the French media, they are engaged less in domestic politics, political parties, the Internet, theaters and cinemas. In contrast, German-Turks seem to generate more cosmopolitan, hybrid, global and reflexive identities in a way that redefines Europeanness, which is subject to constant change. Thus, the experiences of German-Turks seem to indicate that Islam does not necessarily contradict Europeanness, cosmopolitanism, modernity and globalism.

Fifth, liberal citizenship regimes are more welcome by migrants and their children. Western democracies and citizenship regimes seem to fail in treating minority claims as a quest for justice. As Kymlicka and Norman stated, “immigrant groups that feel alienated from the larger national and [religious] identity are likely to be alienated from the political arena as well” (2000:39). Traditional citizenship rhetoric is inclined to advance the interests of the dominant national group at the expense of migrants. Hence, it is unlikely that the classical understanding of citizenship can resolve issues of co-existence of “culturally discrete” entities. In order to avoid the potentiality of conflict and alienation, there is an essential task to be undertaken: citizenship laws

must not be based on prescribed cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic qualities. The formulation of moderate democratic citizenship laws in keeping with this task is likely to lessen the emphasis of migrant groups on their ethnicity, religiosity and nationality.

Sixth, hyphenated identities characterize many of the Euro-Turks. The data indicate that several identify themselves with hyphenated (multiple) identities such as French-Muslim-Turkish and German-Muslim-Turkish. What is remarkable here is that political identity precedes religious and ethnic identities.

Finally, Euro-Turks have by and large been misrepresented in the media. The media has primarily characterized them in strong clichés and stereotypes, and those Euro-Turks who do not fit the stereotypical “Turkish” image are insufficiently represented. Stereotypes reiterate ethnic, cultural and religious boundaries between groups. There are a large number of migrants of Turkish origin who challenge such boundaries.

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