

The other Side(s) of Globalization: A Review Essay

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Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives

By Anthony Giddens, New York: Routledge, 2000, 124 pp.

Two Faces of Liberalism

By John Gray, New York: The New Press, 2000, 161 pp.

Empire

By Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, 478 pp.

What exactly is the globalization debate about? It concerns at least the following questions: Is the world becoming interlinked in a significantly new way? If so, how, why and what should we make of it? The goals of defining the phenomenon, understanding it and appraising it are evident in all of the three books under review, though each differs in its approach to these problems. The lines of contrast question whether globalization's economic, institutional or cultural dimensions are to be highlighted; whether it is a controlled consequence of unequal power or, rather, a process that is so revolutionary and uncontrolled that it presents unprecedented challenges to the powerful; and whether it primarily requires a response at the level of institutional design, collective political assertion, or individual ethical reasoning and practice. One point of agreement among the authors of the books surveyed here is that globalization, in some form, is a real phenomenon that poses unprecedented challenges.

In *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives*, Anthony Giddens offers an empirically informed analytic appraisal of globalization. The book originated as the 1999 Reith Lectures of the BBC World Services. Giddens, who is the director of the London School of Economics and Political Science and an advisor to Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, sought in these lectures to reach a much wider audience than he did in his more academic

treatment of these themes in books such as *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

Giddens's book is divided into five sections (originating from the individual Reith Lectures) entitled "Globalization", "Risk", "Tradition", "Family" and "Democracy". In the first of these, Giddens outlines his thesis that globalization is a fact of the contemporary world, characterized by the collapse of spatial and temporal distance – embodied in expanded global communications and financial transactions – as well as by the diminished power of nation-states. He quotes approvingly Daniel Bell's assertion that "the nation becomes not only too small to solve the big problems, but also too large to solve the small ones."¹ Globalization "pulls upwards" and "pushes downwards", Giddens says, meaning that it creates new spheres of activity and practical challenges on both the large and small scales. As a result, he says, it also "squeezes sideways", creating pressures for the emergence of new economic, political and cultural zones, within and across nations that reconfigure existent patterns of authority in order to cope better with these transformations.

For Giddens, globalization and the current phase of modernization are intertwined, if not indistinguishable, processes. This is the basis of Giddens explanation of the ways in which diverse and seemingly unrelated phenomena of everyday life and of national and global experiences are the far-reaching consequences of a single set of causes. However, it prevents him from assigning specific causal responsibility to globalization as a recent process that perhaps is distinguishable from modernization with its more established logic. In the last four lectures, Giddens attempts to analyze other new features of contemporary societies, linking them, where possible, to the globalization process. This effort is only partially successful, in part, precisely because he refuses to separate modernization from globalization. Thus, although Giddens makes a convincing case that a central feature of contemporary societies is the multiplication and intensification of unpredictable risks, especially the humanly created kind, he does little to link this process to globalization, although it is certainly possible to imagine such connections.

It is in the chapters on democracy and tradition that Giddens invests his most robust efforts to link changes under these headings to globalization, however, not all of his efforts are successful. Perhaps because his lectures are aimed at the general public he is often guilty of assertions, which while interesting and insightful, are dangerously oversimplified. For example, in his account of the rise of a political culture of vociferous assertion of identities, Giddens argues that in a globalizing world, people are increasingly required to give reasons for their beliefs because of their intensified exposure to others "who think differently

1 Giddens, *Runaway World*, p. 31

from them". Those who adopt this project, and in the process endorse the possibility of "tolerance and dialogue", that is those who are "guided by values of a universalist kind", are deemed "cosmopolitans". Giddens contrasts "cosmopolitans" with "fundamentalists". Fundamentalists are those who defend their tradition via a claim that it, and only it, can lead to truth. This account is only superficially plausible, as a perusal of the historical and comparative record makes clear. In fact, there is substantial room and necessity within most historical traditions for reason-giving, if only because in most traditions there has always been an exposure of persons to "those who think differently from them". All of the great religious traditions, for example, attempted to justify their precepts to both believers and nonbelievers alike. Then again, even those such as Locke² and Mill³ who favored tolerance and dialogue, did not favor it for *everyone*, regardless of color, creed and ethnicity.

The distinction drawn by Giddens between fundamentalists and cosmopolitans, on the basis of a propensity for reason-giving, seems, to be at best, nothing more than a stereotype. A more convincing account of how modern "fundamentalisms" are linked to globalization might have explored the manner in which modern fundamentalists differ from earlier traditionalists in the relation between their professed beliefs and their lived experiences. An important paradox today, which Robert Mangabeira Unger has recently drawn attention to, is that the increased will to difference seems to arise alongside diminished actual difference in the experience of everyday life.⁴ I would argue that the vociferousness of claims of identity are, first and foremost, a social and psychological response to the increased uniformity of ostensibly different "forms of life". In particular, as beliefs become "thin" in the sense that they are no longer interwoven with diverse aspects of daily experience, they require maintenance through continual self-assertion. The rise of a politics of identity may, therefore, be a consequence of the increased arbitrariness of the link between diverse beliefs and increasingly uniform experiences rather than of the strain upon unreasoned forms of justification in an increasingly reason-giving world.

Giddens's view of the changing role of democracy makes more sense than does his account of the origins of global identity politics. Here, he surmises that the fact of the rise of transnational social, economic and ecological phenomena that "escape democratic processes" is a reason for a diminished appeal of democracy, whereas diminished "reserves of traditional difference", the rise of the

2 Remember, Locke did not extend toleration to Catholics and atheists.

3 Mill did treat Indians as mature adults, that is, his principle of liberty did not extend to them as it did not extend to children.

4 On this see Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative* (New York: Verso, 1998).

global information society, and the increased need for “flexibility and dynamism” in a global economy are inconsistent with authoritarian government, which depends on the ability to control flows of information and to influence access to privileges through control of settled institutions. Giddens argues that these structural changes necessitate a “democratization of democracy”. He calls for a deepening and a broadening of democracy, which would enable collective decision-making in new (transnational) areas of concern and enrich the range and nature of popular political engagement in existing areas of democratic oversight. Both the analysis and the prescription seem plausible and more than vaguely attractive. How such a program can be implemented politically under the conditions of “democratic deficit” to which Giddens himself points, is far less plausible. Apart from the assertion that the European Union reflects the embryonic form of future global governance, in this area it appears Giddens has little to offer.

Finally, Giddens’s view of the role of power relations (or rather lack of) in creating a globalized world, may be questioned. He refers to globalization as “emerging in an anarchic, haphazard fashion, carried along by a mixture of influences” – it reflects a “runaway world” not driven by a collective human will.⁵ It seems that this view pays too little attention to the manner in which the current form of globalization has been also partially created by the intentional activities of dominant international actors to create, if not what it now is, at least something like it.⁶ This creation has entailed an enormous amount of political work. At times, Giddens displays a tendency to write off the globalization process as if it were nothing but an exogenous spirit, conflicting with his call for an exercising of collective human will to re-shape it.

It may be argued that an appraisal (as contrasted with an understanding) of the phenomenon of globalization requires an engagement with fundamental philosophical questions as well as with the facts of the social world. This may be true for a variety of reasons, among which is the manner in which it creates new forms of authority and relationships that may require examination by normative political theory. The contributions to the debate by John Gray and by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri illustrate this point. These books should be viewed as events of significance both for contemporary philosophy and for the broader understanding of the world in which we live. Both books share a robust insistence on “crossing the chasm” between philosophical reflection and worldly

5 Giddens, *Runaway World*, p. 37.

6 Giddens goes so far in his neglect of the role of power in shaping the form of globalization that he writes of the ostensibly increasing prevalence of “reverse colonization”, in which “non-Western countries influence development in the West.” (ibid, p. 34)

observation – although they could not be more different in style and in substance.

Gray, a professor of European thought at the London School of Economics and Political Science, has previously dealt with globalization in a book published in 1998, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism* (New York, The New Press), just prior to the series of calamitous regional events in East and Southeast Asia, Russia and Latin America that shook the confidence of the world market system's stability. Two years later, Gray supplemented this largely empirical work with a philosophical treatise entitled *Two Faces of Liberalism*. Gray at one time was given credit by Margaret Thatcher for his influence on promoting market conservatism. Once thought of as a Hayekian, Gray had abandoned this position entirely by the time he wrote *False Dawn*, in which he critically surveyed current arguments and evidence for the propensity of the global capitalist system to exacerbate social inequalities and economic instabilities. In that work, Gray's denunciation of the emerging global market economy focuses largely on pragmatic arguments. He argued, for example, that social inequalities in the United States, reflected in such facts as the incarceration rate, undermine its claim to being a model for the world, and that the paths to development of countries such as Japan "falsify" the Enlightenment view that "countries modernize by replicating Western societies".⁷

Two Faces of Liberalism, in which Gray defends a "value pluralist" moral perspective and criticizes the project of bringing about a global convergence of institutional forms, should, I suggest, be seen as a philosophical companion to *False Dawn*. The central claim of value pluralism is that the human good takes irreducibly diverse and often conflicting forms, and that these various forms are reflected in the different lives that people lead, as well as in the different forces in people's lives. Gray admits that the existence of a myriad of forms of the good is a "fact of ethical life". He notes that under globalizing conditions of easy transport and communication, distinct values are increasingly brought into confrontation as an "inescapable social condition".⁸ This raises in a poignantly sharp form, for both nations and individuals, the dilemma of conviviality: How can we live together when we are so far apart?

Value pluralism, as Gray understands it, is a sophisticated form of non-relativism. It asserts that what must be accepted is that an understandable and legitimate diversity exists in which the good is differently interpreted. Gray argues that this demand follows not from the conditional status of truth ("Truth is different on the other side of the Pyrenees"), but rather from the universal truth of a conditional ("Truth is complexly plural here and there"). A particular view

7 Gray, *False Dawn*, p. 170.

8 Gray, *Two Faces of Liberalism*, p. 34.

of the good comes to govern each of our ethical lives not because it is the only true view, but because of the particularity of who each of us are. Value pluralism is not infinitely expansive, but rather accommodates a reasonable diversity determined by the facts of history, rationality and human nature. The incommensurability of values and the imperfect capability of reason, either alone or together, do not generate the truth that the many ways to live a good life cannot be ranked. This insight, according to Gray, carries over to the appraisal of the different forms of society and regimes in which people can live, and to judgments regarding their comparative legitimacy. With regard to this he writes:

“No regime can truly claim to embody the best settlement of conflicts among universal values. Disputes about which regime is best everywhere are without sense. The diversity of regimes is like the diversity of goods. It is not a mark of any lack in human life. It is a sign of the abundance of good lives that human beings can live.”⁹

Gray argues that liberal philosophies that attempt to construct accounts of the good society in the abstract, or accounts that are intended to be universally applicable, are insupportable in the light of value pluralism. While Gray shares with John Rawls a preoccupation with determining the form that shared institutions that can reconcile of plural conceptions of the good should take, he, unlike Rawls, is convinced that it is generally not possible to identify an “overlapping consensus” with which to underpin such institutions. For example, Gray asserts that Rawls’s notion of the “priority of liberty” is not sustainable because it is impossible to prioritize types of liberty prior to resolving conflicts among incommensurable values.

Gray argues that throughout its history, liberalism has displayed “two faces”: in the first, toleration has been justified as a means to the triumph of a single truth through the progressive application of powers of persuasion; and in the second, toleration has been “valued as a condition of peace, and divergent ways of living are welcomed as marks of diversity in the good life.”¹⁰ The first tradition, which Gray traces to the “canonical” account of Locke, tolerates diversity but looks forward to its ultimate demise. The second tradition, represented early on by Hobbes, views the task before society as creating an appropriate *modus vivendi* under which diverse conceptions of the good might coexist. Gray argues that history and introspection warn us against the belief that a shared conception of the human good will ever evolve. Accordingly, he asserts: “Liberalism’s future lies in turning its face away from the ideal of rational consensus

9 Ibid, p. 68.

10 Ibid, p. 105.

and looking to *modus vivendi*".¹¹ The institutions that will sustain a *modus vivendi* in a particular moment will depend on the actual pattern of human diversity.

It is worth asking how this approach complements Gray's critique of emergent globalized capitalism in his earlier book. As mentioned earlier, Gray's philosophical doctrine leads to a condemnation of efforts to press for the creation of uniform ways of life and institutions throughout the world. The significance of diverse national institutions is that they may each emerge from a distinct *modus vivendi* as a result of the variant pattern of human diversity, across and within nations. To attempt to eradicate such diversity is to wage war against legitimate moral plurality. It should be noted that Gray's hostility towards globalization derives from its assumed tendency to impose uniformity, and that this leaves open the possibility that he would accept, and perhaps even embrace, a globalization that does not entail such imposition.

Gray offers reasons why we should seek conditions of coexistence with others whose values differ from ours – accepting that their lives and their institutions will be different from ours, possibly in ways that challenge our comprehension. However, he offers us little guidance as to *how* we should do so, whether in terms of the psychological orientation of the self, or in terms of the constructions of shared institutions.

Take, for example, Gray's discussion of the role of human rights in pursuing a *modus vivendi*: "We will come to think of human rights as convenient articles of peace, whereby individuals and communities with conflicting values and interests may consent to coexist."¹² On this account, the particular content of the human rights that merit recognition is potentially shifting, although it is likely to have recurrent features due to shared elements of our nature, because we can only know what rights to protect according to the pattern of the specific and possibly changing interests that we have. This view seems, however, to generate a dilemma: How can an account of human rights, as simply an article of peace, be reconciled with the fact that we often strongly *desire* to uphold them, and that it must be so if they are to be realized? The ferociousness of conflicts over human rights today may stem, in part, as Gray would have it, from the failure to recognize that the true role of such rights is to establish the conditions of a *modus vivendi*, and will thus require significant compromise. But a *modus vivendi* might simply result from a balance of force, encapsulating a bare minimum of agreed upon rights, and yet maintaining substantial room for sharp disagreements deriving from differing conceptions of the good. Under such conditions individuals could disagree strongly about the rights that people should have,

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

even if they agreed on the rights that should be recognized in the interest of peace. Moreover, their struggle on behalf of their own values could lead to instability of the *modus vivendi*. This circumstance does not, in fact, seem to differ greatly from that which currently prevails.

Gray is unclear about what his vision of a *modus vivendi* requires of individual agents in this situation. He suggests that all that is required of individuals in order to sustain a *modus vivendi* is that they be sufficiently motivated by the benefits of peaceful coexistence. But he also suggests that liberals in particular should wholeheartedly embrace a value-pluralist morality in which "divergent ways of living are welcomed as marks of diversity in the good life." This second view is far more demanding in that it conceives of a *modus vivendi* as requiring an active recognition of the value of others' lives, whether or not we share the values by which they live.

What is the extent and nature of the space that lies between the recognition of the value of others' lives and the desire to assert ones' own values? Here is where a person can reasonably expect to exercise his or her powers of persuasion – but how is the individual value-pluralist liberal to find and live within this space in the course of his or her life? What of a liberal society in its relationships to others? The answers to these questions will influence the form of the *modus vivendi* for which we can best hope. Shared institutions that are upheld when the "marks of diversity in the good life" are welcomed, are likely to differ from those that can arise merely from commitment to the requirements of peaceful coexistence. It is likely that they will also be much more difficult to achieve. Gray provides us with a view of how to address the confrontation of values that are mutually incommensurable. Still, without an existential doctrine and a moral psychology, his account falls short of establishing a needed "ethics of interrelation" for a globalized age.

Then again would an ethics of interrelation alone be enough to resolve the dilemmas of contemporary globalization? Contemporary globalization may be structurally distinct from the forms of economic, political and social integration that have preceded it, requiring new conceptual tools both to understand and respond to it. In their book *Empire*, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri attempt to supply such conceptual tools. Their efforts cross many boundaries of the various intellectual disciplines. They approach the problems from the different standpoints of critical literary theory and radical history, philosophy and political science, and supply us with a wide-ranging account of the nature both of globalization and of what they argue to be its mechanics of new forms of domination. Their account has failed to satisfy most of those who have reviewed their book in the popular press, either intellectually or politically. However, while I agree that their book is poorly written, poorly organized and in certain parts it is difficult to follow, I, for one, am impressed by their erudition and in-

tellectual audacity. In what follows I shall address but one small aspect of Hardt and Negri's multi-layered argument – the formal and institutional structure of globalization and the impact it has on the forms of possible opposition.

Hardt is a professor of literature at Duke University, while Negri, an ideological leader of the Italian "autonomist" movements, is currently a prisoner in a Roman Jail. In *Empire*, they attempt to describe the logic of contemporary globalization as involving the spread of cultural, juridical and political innovations that are associated with the United States over the space of the globe. The extension of these innovations constitutes, so they argue, the projection of a new kind of power – "network power" – that has no particular center and is not defined by being the exclusive possession of a particular identifiable group. This network power is also very flexible in that it is capable of adapting to the general requirements of the maintenance of order in the different realms in which it operates. The realms in which network power operates, Hardt and Negri refer to as "Empire". They argue that the current global system increasingly displays the functioning structure of classical empires, particularly that of ancient Rome, in that it operates via a diffuse structure and is characterized by its operating according to a common set of institutional principles rather than by the everyday exercise of direct control.¹³ However, in the interest of order, imperial power (which may correspond to the assertion of force of a particular dominant state, such as the United States or, more generally, to supranational organizations and initiatives) may be called upon to intervene in specific cases so as to maintain the rule-based regime of network power.¹⁴

Hardt and Negri claim that the emerging world order is indebted to the institutional model and historical example of U.S. society in at least two ways. First, it reflects the principle of the absorption of new political and social jurisdictions into an "open space" that is, in principle, "unbounded" and in which "diverse and singular relations" are being "incessantly reinvented".¹⁵ Captured in this image is an idea of the polity as being constantly engaged in the ongoing expansion into a frontier, as well as the ongoing creation and management of internal, social diversity. Contemporary globalization, Hardt and Negri argue, is characterized by an analogous expansion of common legal and institutional structures over the globe. The process of expansion of the domain of Empire leads to the

13 Hence, they hold that "imperial expansion has nothing to do with imperialism"; rather "against such imperialisms, Empire extends and consolidates the model of network power". (Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, pp. 166-67)

14 Thus, Hardt and Negri describe the special role of the United States as deriving from its being "the only power able to manage international justice, not as a function of its own national motives, but in the name of global right". (Ibid, p. 180)

15 Ibid, p. 182.

continual incorporation of new social groups. In addition, the restless pursuit of opportunities by capital inside this expanding domain leads to a continuous fracturing and recombination of social identities. It is specifically in this way that the postmodern world of Empire is distinct from the modern world that preceded it, which was a world marked by the relatively settled, even if largely fictitious, identities within national boundaries.

Second, Hardt and Negri argue that contemporary globalization reflects the singular American constitutional motivation that there is no role for “the transcendence of power”. The U.S. Doctrine of checks and balances, they point out, sought a republican variant of a Roman principal that balanced monarchic, aristocratic and democratic power, assigning roles instead to the executive, judicial and legislative branches. Under contemporary globalization, Hardt and Negri argue that an analogous “mixed constitution” of the global order has gained a *de facto* force. This mixed constitution consists of holders of a “monarchic unity of power and its global monopoly of force; aristocratic articulations through transnational corporations and nation-states; democratic-representational *comitia*, presented again in the form of nation-states along with various kinds of NGOs, media organizations and other ‘popular’ organisms.”¹⁶ This political framework – acting jointly with increasingly flexible and shifting global production and the continuous fracturing and recombining of social identities – forms an increasingly unified new regime of accumulation, in which capital seeks to exploit all opportunities within the constantly changing terrain of Empire. This postmodern regime of accumulation is to be contrasted with its modern predecessor, which relied heavily on relatively settled institutional conditions within national boundaries.

The general description of contemporary globalization, as operating according to a decentralized principle of replications of common institutional forms, seems more immediately fruitful than the attempt to draw an analogy between the effective constitution of the globalized world and that of the United States. The greatest analytical strength of Hardt and Negri’s account of the world order appears to be its conception of the current process of globalization as a phenomenon of power, even if it is a decentered and diffused power. Hardt and Negri also conceive of Empire as constituted, in part, in a manner that is at once spontaneous and “self-organizing”. This seems to correspond to the widespread intuition that the uniformity-producing element in contemporary globalization results from the assertion of a form of power, which corresponds to the increased difficulty of existing outside of its reach (i.e. Empire). At the same time, it avoids a reductive view of that power as emanating from a single determinate source. However, this account also skirts the boundaries of an ill-defended func-

16 Ibid, p. 314.

tionalism due principally, I would suggest, to its failure to articulate precisely what is the chain of causes underlying the system's self-organization.¹⁷

A related lack in Hardt and Negri's account may best be brought out by comparing it with *Runaway World*, which is characterized by a lively sense of the systematic uncertainty that besets the contemporary global order, by reason of decentralized and incomplete human knowledge and control over both social institutions and nature. Although Hardt and Negri recognize the prevalence and unpredictability of crises to which the global order is vulnerable, they conceive of these primarily in terms of the unforeseeable "sequence of events" set in train by an "insurrectional event" in which acts of rebellion upset the Empire system's logic.¹⁸ Hardt and Negri claim that there is a recurrent systematic tendency to return to a dominant pattern of power that operates according to specific principles. Although this may be largely true, there is a contrasting perspective in which the world is experienced as resolutely outside the control of those acting within it due to the absence of a discernable systemic logic. The second perspective seems to capture as important a part of contemporary experience that the first perspective is blind to.

While Hardt and Negri emphasize that contemporary globalization proceeds according to the logic of modular adoption of established institutional forms, there is a strong perception in influential quarters of an embryonic context between powerful regional groupings of countries over the structure of the world economic system and the hierarchy of dominance that will prevail within it. From this point of view, the contest within the world system is not over the flow of "flotsam and jetsam" atop the imperturbable skeletal structure, but rather a real struggle over the terms in which this order will be constituted. How are we to judge which of these pictures of the world we live in is the right one? In light of these controversies, it seems to me that Hardt and Negri's confidence that the workings within and over the globe are systematic is, at this point in time, premature.

Convinced of the coherent and overriding logic of contemporary globalization, Hardt and Negri argue that liberation from the processes of increased economic, social, cultural and psychological control represented by the extension of Empire can only be served by working through the processes of Empire itself.¹⁹ In this regard they sing the praises of the migrant, the nomad and the deserter, whose wanderings are both set in train by the flexible economy of the

17 This difficulty also tends to overshadow much of the Marxian tradition to which Hardt and Negri claim they belong.

18 Ibid, pp. 60-61.

19 "The multitude, in its will to be against and its desire for liberation, must push through Empire to come out on the other side." (Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 218)

empire and act against its predictive, extractive and regulatory powers. For Hardt and Negri, these figures reflect the productivity and creativity of the “multitude” whose “perpetual motion” is, at one and the same time, a consequence of Empire, as well as a form of resistance to it. It seems that there is an inconsistency within Hardt and Negri’s own narrative. If, as they claim, Empire is the creation of a framework for “perpetual motion” (the restless global reassertion of systemic power under constantly changing conditions), then how by their movement, can these isolated figures, no matter how numerous, contest Empire’s own logic?

I would argue that, even within Hardt and Negri’s own framework, the defense of place may be as necessary and as potent a political act as is its abandonment. The assertion of place in a decentered, shifting, uniformizing world may be an act that more effectively contests Empire’s logic than does movement. But if a place is to be made for the collective defense of place, then it is also necessary to find a way in which the possessors of the different, sometimes incommensurable values associated with these places, may find each other to be mutually intelligible and even commonly supportable. In contrast to Hardt and Negri’s hoped-for resistance by a “multitude in movement”, can there be a role for the collective assertion of a “multitude in place”? Here the careful moral philosophizing of John Gray may have something to offer to the alternately despairing and exultant social theorizing of Hardt and Negri. A “multitude in place” requires an ethics of interrelation by which each particular and will-grounded subject may find a basis of commonality with others. The discovery of a sense of commonality amidst incommensurability seems a requisite for the assertion of any new form of collective self-assertion that may act as a counter-railing force in contemporary globalization. However, how such a discovery might occur remains an open and difficult question, given the contradictory movement of the creation of common forms of experience the world over and the ever-widening horizon of incommensurability experienced by ordinary people thrust into contact with new values and new forms of life.²⁰

20 I would never have read these books if Henriette Dahan-Kalev had not drawn my attention to the importance of the phenomenon of globalization and to the relative silence of philosophers on it. The notes for this essay were written in New York where Edward Perlmuter gave me free rein of his magnificent library. Both of these people also discussed with me many of the ideas in the books reviewed.