

Blurring Centers and Resisting Peripheries: The U.S. Military in Hawai'i

KATHY E. FERGUSON AND PHYLLIS TURNBULL¹
University of Hawai'i

ABSTRACT: *The militarization of Hawai'i offers a useful geographical and political space for tracking tangled relations of power and resistance. Hawai'i is both a "center" of militarization and a "periphery" of resistance. The most militarized of the U.S. states, Hawai'i is the center of the U.S. Pacific command, with its pervasive retenue of personnel, technologies, and spaces of training and deployment. This centrality is enabled by a century and a half of colonization, which has defined Hawai'i as the irreplaceable center of U.S. military operations in the Pacific. Yet Hawai'i's indigenous population, its environmental forces, and other local practices also position the islands as both marginal and resistant to militarization. By tracking the complex processes of hegemony and opposition in Hawai'i's militarized spaces, we aim to denaturalize the military's claims to meaning and to make space for more contestatory voices to be heard.*

Introduction

What is at stake in the distinction between "center" and "periphery" within contemporary political debates? The distinction has been useful both to hegemonic interests who take for granted their own centrality in the world, and to resistant voices who position themselves as uncontained by, and thus resistant to, prevailing power structures. The distinction suggests a stable spatial contrast between what is "in" and what is "out," between those intellectual and political spaces in which prevailing practices of power have a firm grip and those which are both more excluded from power's rewards and more antagonistic toward its productions. Yet the complex practices of hegemony and resistance can never be fully charted on such a spatial map. The insides and outsides of things always leak, bringing oppositional voices into uncomfortable intimacy with that which they oppose while unraveling the seeming docility of hegemonic landscapes.

The islands of Hawai'i and their relations to the U.S. military offer a provocative example of the complex interweavings of power and resistance. The

¹ This paper is partially drawn and revised from Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, *Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai'i* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

50th state of the United States can simultaneously be located in the middle of nowhere, surrounded by the Pacific Ocean, thousands of miles from any respectable-sized land mass, and in the middle of the Pacific rim, conveniently central to the American military gaze on Asia and the Pacific. Viewing Hawai'i as the most militarized state in the U.S. highlights the vast amounts of land owned or controlled by the military (up to 23% of the island of O'ahu, 5-10 % of the state), the large population of military personnel and their families (about 15% of the population of O'ahu), and the pervasive markers of militarized physical and cultural space in street names, freeway exit signs, parades, schools, and newspapers (First Hawaiian Bank, 1993: 14, 10). Viewing Hawai'i as a site of resistance to militarization highlights a contrary set of characteristics: an indigenous population decimated but not entirely displaced by colonization, a Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement that is both fragmented and dynamic, an entangled immigration history, and a complex set of environmental, cultural and political frictions. Contests over Hawai'i's militarization are both vigorous and incomplete, flagging militarization not as an historical fact but as a dynamic and contested process of constituting and maintaining a particular kind of order. By tracking some of the processes by which Hawai'i's militarization is both achieved and contested, we offer a complex political map in which the centers and the peripheries of Hawai'i and of the U.S. national security state are fruitfully confused. In the process we hope to denaturalize military claims to meaning and make space for more anti-hegemonic voices to be heard.

War Talk and National Security Discourse

The military's *raison d'être* in Hawai'i (and elsewhere) is as a guarantor of national security; i.e., the military exists in order to fight and win wars. But these two figurations of the military's mission - waging war successfully vs. defending national security - are not, after all, the same. There is both interdependence and incompatibility between the discourse of war and the discourse of national security as ways of representing the military's legitimacy. Both the frictions and the attachments between the two can be seen in the different actions, metaphors, narratives, loci of responsibility - contrasting world constructions, in fact - that are associated with each. Edward Said notes that a mix of powerful discourses can interact to produce a discursive "strategic formation," a dense weave of texts that enables hegemonic account to "acquire mass, density, and referential power among themselves and thereafter in the culture at large" (Said, 1979: 20). The interactive discursive economies of war talk and national security discourse turn Hawai'i into coherent subject matter and put into circulation a "common currency" through which this coherence can be produced and maintained (Said, 1979: 213). Yet while this militarized coherence dominates the public understandings of Hawai'i, local resistances both disrupt and infiltrate the military's order, making other Hawai'i possible.

The relation between the two discursive realms can be thought of as an example of Roxanne Lynn Doty's concept of "double-writing." Doty

characterizes double-writing as the “[s]uccessful practices...that produce the state's powerful image and simultaneously conceal this production” (1996a: 176). Following Homi Bhabha, she links the production of the state's powerful image with the pedagogical aspects of language, while connecting the concealment of that production with language's performative dimensions:

The pedagogical refers to the givenness of an object, the presumption of its self-evident presence and essential identity (e.g., the state, the domestic community, the inside)... The pedagogical is intervened in and contested by the performative (the productive aspect of language). The performative introduces a 'gap' or 'emptiness' to the signifier by casting a shadow between it and the signified. (1996a: 176)

In the “double-time” of the pedagogical and the performative the production of claims to timelessness is hidden in plain sight (Bhabha, 1990: 297). The pedagogical gives discourse “an authority that is based on the pre-given,” while the “repeating and reproductive process” of the performative marks “a process of signification that must erase any prior or originating presence” (Bhabha, 1990: 297). The interactions of pedagogical and performative operations produce a strategic formation that both anchors “Hawai’i” in the web of the familiar and offers some hints about the making of anchors.

Within both war talk and national security discourse important tensions operate. Each depends upon assertions about what can be taken for granted in the world, and each disguises those assertions in order to maintain its potentially insecure foundations. Before investigating further this level of double-writing *within* the discourses, we want to map another level of doubleness, that which characterizes the relations *between* the two discursive practices. Our analysis, then, focuses on a kind of doubled double-writing. That is, each way of configuring international bellicosity simultaneously confounds and underwrites the other, while both call upon parallel internal dependencies/interruptions between the given and the manufactured.

Looking first between the two discursive fields, the contrasting interdigitations between war talk and national security discourse reflect the incommensurate social registers within which they function. War's companions are heroes and victories to be sure but also destruction, loss, death, pain, dirt, disease, and hunger. War carries the risk that we might lose a way of life, and life itself. The seductive glory of war talk, of sacrifice and redemption, has embedded within it the implicit threat of bereavement, suffering, and annihilation. The weakness of war talk as a strategy to legitimate the militarization of the world is that it too-readily generates its opposite, “peace talk.” While there are available strategies within war talk to make war sound at least temporarily attractive - duty, honor, glory, manhood, risk, excitement, victory, destiny - there is also an undeniable linguistic affirmation in war's opposite, peace. While peace may be boringly effeminate, it connects readily to

prosperity, and serves as war's justification: as one Army recruiter told one of our researchers, in the midst of the Gulf War, "We're about peace, not war" (Johnson, 1991 interview). At the same time, the limits of pacifism are suggested by its close links to the universe of war; peace talk may not be as effective, at least without recalibration, in countering the differently-ordered insistencies of national security discourse.

National security discourse lowers a different stage set, one of a powerful sovereign state whose continued security "compels it to coordinate and discipline...the peacelessness that reigns without." (Klein, 1989: 101). Through crisis management, intelligence gathering, and maintenance of a "high state of readiness", technologically sophisticated weaponry can be aimed at or easily arranged against the world's depersonalized or demonized forces of disorder. National security discourse deploys a tactical view of the world, a problematic of "strategic control at deep levels" (Haraway, 1989: 110). This way of talking about military objectives and entitlements recruits the somewhat more sedate, rationalist language of stability, predictability, and development. The world is configured not so much as a vast potential battlefield under the rocket's red glare, but more as a calculable standing reserve of population and resources, always potentially unstable yet amenable to strategic reasoning.

The thoroughness and instrumental rationality of national security discourse is expressed by Admiral Charles Larson, then-Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command headquartered at Camp Smith on O'ahu, as he located his Pacific Command as "the largest unified command in the world" (United States Congress, 1993: 67). He told the Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, that "[o]ur area of responsibility stretches over 100 million square miles, about 52 percent of the Earth's surface in an area that encompasses two-thirds of the Earth's population, an area where we have relations with more than 40 nations in a coordinated strategy" (ibid: 67). Admiral Larson employed the tools of administrative rationality and management by objectives, reaching into his "tool kit" to produce the mechanisms "for engagement, for deterrence, for influence, and for rapid reaction" (ibid: 79).

Through the lens of national security, the world is a dangerous place. Relatively little recalibration has been necessary to carry this language of danger into the post-Cold War era; as a 1991 editorial in the *Honolulu Advertiser* proclaimed, "Uncertainty seems to have replaced communism as the biggest threat to U.S. security interests in the Asia Pacific region" (Griffin, 1991: Focus-3). Quoting then-Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Daniel Inouye that uncertainty is "our great challenge" and "the underlying issue," the editorial gave full support to Admiral Larson's suggestion that, in the absence of a reliable Cold War enemy, "economic competition for resources and markets may heighten latent regional friction." (Griffin, 1991: Focus 3) Unpredictability and uncertainty represent dangers to which the state responds with ever-heightened vigilance and intensified efforts at control. National security discourse "manifests itself as a set of power relations governing both domestic

and international politics.” Its strategy is “engaged in construction and circulation of particular visions of political life...[which] entail the violent domestication of forces that are presented as external, alien, and in need of taming.” Its effect is “to inscribe a political space with violence” (Klein, 1989: 99). The possibility of naming danger differently disappears as the common currency for producing coherence is monopolized by the national security state.

Unlike war talk, which finds it difficult to disavow its debt to peace, national security has no attractive opposite to which its debts to otherness might come due. While a man of war might long for peace, what other state of affairs could a functionary of the national security state be *for*? The answer, it seems, is *more* national security. National security discourse goes on forever because, without radically altering the terms of debate, it is difficult to define an attractive alternative. National security is simply the rational path to the stability that, as Admiral Larson sees it, assures “continued access to the money, to the markets, to the resources, to the trading partners in Asia” (United States Congress, 1993: 71). National security also, allegedly, promotes non-violence: the Admiral assures the Senate subcommittee that “We do not want anyone to be tempted to resort to force. We want that to be unthinkable” (ibid: 75).

National security discourse also goes on forever because, dependent upon its self-constitution vis-a-vis “danger,” it is obsessed with establishing and protecting boundaries that can never be finally fixed. The national security discourse provides a mode of ordering the unruliness “beyond the borders of the sovereign state; ‘over there’ in bordering or far distant regions where strange forces of otherness well up to challenge domestic order” (Klein, 1989: 101). In the national security view, the world is “a ‘tough’ world of power politics...presented as a fully articulated given” with no sense that such language assists in the creation of “that to which it purports to be responding” (ibid: 100). National security discourse’s pedagogical moment is the alleged givenness of this danger; its constant performative labor lies in the production and disguise of this self-evident given within the hegemonic “common sense” of a society. The same institutions that produce Admiral Larson’s hope that peace will come via strengthened national security efforts also help to produce threats to peace through the massive and indiscriminate international trade in armaments (Sennott, 1996: B1-12).

War talk and national security discourse carry two distinct erotic charges. War talk enunciates a young and reckless masculinity, a martial brotherhood, an immediate phallic conquest of risk, activation of loyalty, quest for victory. National security discourse’s seductions are somewhat more sanitized, calling upon a “drive to superior power” (Cohn, 1987: 697) that combines the impersonality of risk management with the erotic enthusiasms of sleek, high-tech weaponry. War talk recruits us into the soldier’s world, where young men, and sometimes women, can become impassioned about duty, heroism or just plain “kicking butt,” while citizens readily rally to “support our boys.” National security discourse invites us into a more sophisticated arena, where sober

middle-aged men calculate strategic political and economic advantages via an erotics of domination and control. If war talk evokes the image of a college fraternity run amok, national security discourse is more akin to a well-ordered system of organized crime.

Returning to Doty's understanding of double-writing, both national security discourse and war talk simultaneously assert what is real and disguise the productive labor that such assertions require; that is, they both "move ambivalently between the pedagogical and the performative" (Doty, 1996a: 179). The pedagogical moment of both war talk and national security discourse entails what Doty calls "the territorial trap," the assumptions that "states are fixed units of sovereign space," that "the domestic/international dichotomy is unproblematic," and that "states are spatial containers of societies" (ibid: 172). Beyond these givens, national security discourse elaborates the extended perception of danger that both fuels and undermines its quest for order. The ceaseless performative labor of the national security state is in the production and disguise of the obviousness which surrounds its pedagogical assumptions. The assertions by Admiral Larson and countless others that our common reality is one of uncertainty and danger teach citizens, by example and repetition, *The Big Is*. The charts, graphs, calculations, plans, the sophisticated lingo of "forward presence," and "crisis response," are the performative techniques that make possible the assumptions which *The Big Is* requires. At the same time, the double-writing of pedagogical/performative "threatens to undo these very assumptions" through practices that reveal the fluidity of that which was taken as given (Doty 1996a: 179). "[T]he continual, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical" asserts the uncontestability of danger, its foundational presence; "the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative" does the necessary work to secure the obviousness of danger, while ironically calling attention, via its busy labor, to the need for such securing in the first place (Bhabha, 1990: 297). In the gap between "the iconic image of authority and the movement of the signifier that produces the image," there is a "space of liminality" where the work necessary to assure the appearance of certainty also signifies certainty's potential collapse (Bhabha, 1990: 300). This space of liminality borders on both center and periphery, inviting excluded voices to see more clearly into the production of the center itself. By excavating the gap between performative and pedagogical moments of discourse, resistant perspectives can more lucidly contest the prevailing terms of inclusion in conversations about security and order.

The Production of Danger: Arms Sales and Terrorism

An example of the doubled doubleness of war talk and national security discourse and of the pedagogical and the performative, looms in the discourse and institutions of international arms sales. As the Pentagon has bought relatively fewer arms in the post-Cold War era, U.S. arms manufacturers, eschewing conversion to less bellicose production, have turned abroad, making the U.S.

"the leading exporter of conventional weapons". Government-to-government sales by the U.S. account for 64% of the global market; this number does not include "direct commercial sales" between U.S. manufacturers and foreign states, which may total another 6 billion dollars (Department of Defense Report). International arms bazaars such as the Dubai Air Show, "the Third World's largest showcase of the latest high-tech weaponry," offer sites for the effective merger of war talk and national security discourse into an effective sales pitch. Jaunty American pilots sporting Gulf War decorations team up with marketing experts from the arms industries to impress potential customers who have the millions/billions of dollars available to purchase the latest in fighter jets, attack helicopters, missiles, and tanks. The presence of dashing pilots in full military regalia, boasting about the weapons' successful performances against Iraq, brings a dash of war talk into the stew of national security discourse. "Our role here is national security," says Air Force Major Todd Freuhling of the international sales, emphasizing the alleged "regional stability" such sales are meant to secure. But some of the erotic pleasures of the weapons traffic also peek out: "[Q]uite frankly, we are putting our hardware on display because it's the best in the world and we're proud of it" (Sennott, 1996: B2).

Investigating the complex relations between pedagogical and performative allows one to see the discursive and institutional circumstances of production of the given. The international arms trade connects the pedagogical (the litany of "it's a dangerous world") with the discursive and material construction of the circumstances of such danger (the U.S. and other nations are making the world more dangerous by selling all these weapons). Indeed, it is a dangerous world - and the U.S. assures it will be so by exporting billions of dollars in weapons to those very regions whose potential instability, and accompanying inclination to violent suppression of internal critics, fuels Pentagon commitments to prepare to fight in two simultaneous regional conflicts. Suggestively named "blow-back" in military talk, U.S. troops have faced American-made weapons "in virtually every conflict into which the US has sent troops since the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union" (Sennott, 1996: B6). During the 1980's, for example, the United States supplied \$200 million in weapons to the government of Somalia, then spent \$2 billion and saw twenty four American soldiers die in subsequent "peace-keeping" efforts (Spain, 1995: 47). "We end up fueling the conflicts we seek to contain," comments Director for the Institute of Defense and Disarmament Studies Randall Forsberg (Sennott, 1996: B3).

The arms trade also produces insecurity in the form of loss of jobs for American workers. Despite promises otherwise, jobs are often transferred overseas along with the weapons. Known in the trade as "off-sets," such deals transfer production jobs along with weapons systems to the purchasing nations (Sennott, 1996: B11). Pentagon estimates place loss of U.S. defense jobs at one million since 1989, and project 700,000 more by 1997 (Sennott, 1996: B11). Meanwhile, "leading defense manufacturers report big profits, surging stock prices and huge increases in compensation for top executives (an average of \$3.5

million a year for the 10 biggest companies)” (Sennott 1996: B2). While “the Pentagon is a very costly employment agency”, the combination of shrinking jobs and expanding profits suggests a capital-friendly, labor-unfriendly security strategy (Moore, 1995: 37).

Enhanced profits for arms manufacturers, including Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Bell, McDonnell Douglass, and Hughes, translate into giant leaps in the insecurity of the most vulnerable Americans. Public monies for schools, hospitals, and other social services shrink while tax dollars subsidize the arms trade. Weapons profits are enhanced by the U.S. policy, begun under President Bush, to waive the “recoupment fees” originally intended to reimburse public coffers for the massive amounts of tax dollars (\$36 billion a year under the Clinton administration) spent on weapons research, development, and testing (Sennott 1996: B2). Other direct subsidies include the Pentagon's annual \$3.5 billion “foreign military finance” program, which gives money to “friendly” nations for the purchase of arms. Tax dollars also go to support industry mergers such as that between Lockheed and Martin Marietta, between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, and between Raytheon and Hughes Aircraft: public monies subsidize the CEO bonuses, the companies' consolidation costs, and the subsequent loss of jobs to U.S. workers (Vartabedian 1997:B-8; Hartung 1997: 6). Public monies subsidize loan guarantees for arms purchases and marketing presentations at shows such as that at Dubai: “The United States spends more than \$450 million and employs nearly 6,500 full-time people to promote and service foreign arms sales by U.S. companies” (Ivins 1996: A-8). Money that could have been used to build schools or hospitals disappears into the giant maw of arms profits. Nobel Peace Laureate Oscar Arias Sanchez noted:

It is the greed of the arms trade that threatens our common future. In a world where 900 million adults do not know how to read or write, 1 billion people do not have access to potable water, the arms merchants bear much of the blame for this poverty” (Sennott, 1996: B3).²

At the same time, the arms trade produces a certain kind of security for the arms producers themselves; it virtually guarantees the demand for more and

² Charles Sennott's informative series of articles in the *Boston Globe* both reveal and conceal some of the performative energies at work in supporting the national security discourse's dangerous pedagogy. On the one hand, the articles relentlessly sniff out the alibis for the arms trade that are manifested in elements of political economy. On the other hand, the article participates vigorously and without comment in the patriarchal dimensions of arms accumulation, manufacture, and sale. Sennott's prose reproduces fully and faithfully the phallic insecurities of countries with small missiles, the confident masculine excitements of the well-endowed states. He is appropriately and gratifyingly suspicious of the self-interested justifications given by corporations and governments for obscene expenditures on weapons, but entirely unaware of the masculine investments that also underwrite the arms trade. Sennott has a keen eye for the discourses of economic privilege and state power, but little visual acuity when it comes to phallogentric entitlements. Our thanks to the students in Feminist Theory, fall, 1996, for their help in deciphering the mixture of speech and silence in Sennott's work.

better weapons in the near future to contest those now for sale. Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense under Reagan, now a senior fellow at Brookings, says “[i]t has become a money game: an absurd spiral in which we export arms only to have to develop more sophisticated ones to counter those spread out all over the world”. While Mr. Korb's concern that this trend “undermines our moral authority in the New World Order” might be somewhat belated, he correctly points out that U.S. officials, under these circumstances, will have little success convincing other governments to sell fewer arms. In defense of the expanded arms trade, a spokesman for the weapons manufacturers chief lobby, the Aerospace Industry Association, claims: “If you look at other markets, like medical instruments, supercomputers, et cetera, the US has 70 to 80 percent. The question isn't why do we have so many exports in the aerospace market; the question is why have we had so little?”. The normalization of weapons sales as just another business deal, like the normalization of the military as just another job, helps to hide in plain sight the material production of the circumstances that produce the pedagogy of the national security discourse. (Sennott 1996: B2).

Another example of the production of danger that then appears to be simply found is in the international word traffic in “terrorism.” Terrorism is a kind of unlawful violence, violence by those who are not (yet) states, violence that doesn't play by the rules. Terrorism is outside the boundaries of the legitimate use of force as states have established them. The pedagogical given is the assumption, as Doty remarks, that states are sovereign spatial containers of legitimate societies, with clear boundaries of inside and outside, with guns and the right to use them. Acts of war against states by non-states are terror, not war after all. Terrorism denies the legitimacy or potency of the boundaries that states are constantly reinforcing (Soguk, 1999). Yet the terrorists are emulating the means by which states initially became states, the messy beginnings that are quickly abstracted from political argument once mythic origins are secured. Further, the goal of the terrorists is often to emulate the states, to become states themselves. The state system produces the terror by monopolizing legitimacy and excluding from the picture both its non-state others and its own story of how it became a state (Connolly, 1991). The performative move here includes all the effort that goes into making and hiding these exclusions, naturalizing the boundaries that are nonetheless ceaselessly negotiated and renegotiated.

Such effort becomes temporarily visible in circumstances such as the disclosure of CIA drug deals with the Nicaraguan Contras, thought of as terrorists by those loyal to the Sandinista government. Periodic public allegations of CIA involvement in cocaine traffic into the US in order to secure fundings for illegal weapons shipments to the Contras might temporarily reveal the performative at work behind the pedagogical, thus questioning the allegedly stable boundaries between inside and outside, legal and illegal and between policy and crime. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the state itself might unravel. The CIA, supposedly the brains of the U.S. national security apparatus, appears as

less than helpful in monitoring danger and guarding our nation by collecting needed intelligence. But it excels at cutting deals with drug cartels, stimulating demand for crack in U.S. cities, and illegally channeling weapons into other nation's civil conflicts (Webb, 1996). The naturalization of danger becomes unanchored when one can see the performative at work - the arms merchants' production of social, occupational, and military insecurity which then legitimizes further arms production; the state system's production of terrorism which then legitimizes extensive surveillance and regulation of citizens; the CIA's contribution to producing the drug traffic that then legitimizes the massively expensive and destructive "war on drugs." In these moments of contradiction between the pedagogical and the performative, the dangerous politics of national security discourse become more visible and more vulnerable to critique.

National security discourse operates as a kind of artful dodger behind its more visible and in some ways more vulnerable partner, war talk. While both war talk and national security discourse are produced out of the interaction between what can be taken for granted and what is necessary to construct the taken-for-granted, war talk operates more fully with the pedagogical and is thus more vulnerable to having its productions flushed out of hiding. National security discourse is tilted more toward the performative, thus better at hiding its productions. Our goal is to tease out the intertwining doubleness of national security discourse and war talk, and of the performative and the pedagogical, to leave them no place to hide, in order to challenge the military's understandings of Hawai'i and the rest of the world. The stubborn persistence of Hawai'i's peripheral voices, their refusal to be erased by military narratives (or the related claims of "developers") suggests that militarized hegemony is eroded by that which it excludes. By calling attention to the discursive practices producing military discourses, we can make more space for these competing claims and stubborn obstructions that challenge militarized monopolies on meaning.

Peripheries and Localities in Hawai'i

The intertwined voices of war talk and national security discourse combine to do their work in the stories the military tells about itself in Hawai'i. The glories and the sacrifices hailed in war talk appear prominently in the solemn ranks of soldier's graves at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, in the shrine to 1,177 dead crewmen at the *Arizona* Memorial in Pearl Harbor, and in scattered representations of loyal citizens, weary soldiers, and national heroes at the Fort DeRussy Army Museum. National security discourse comes more visibly onto these scenes in the close scrutiny of military techniques, the evaluation of strategy and tactics, and most of all in the historical narrative of Hawai'i's relation to the western world. The discourse of national security often appears to be seamless, completely self-referential; it disguises its debt toward otherness by bounding its discursive space with mirrors. In this it is much like Edward Said's description of Orientalism, which shares with magic and with mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system, in

which objects are what they are *because* they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can either dislodge or alter. (1979: 70)

The self-referentiality of national security discourse continues that of the first western explorers in Hawai'i: Captain Cook and his sponsors had determined what land masses and water passages ought to be findable prior to any looking, and then took their own story as evidence for its validity (Cook 1967: 2, clxviii). Our interviews with public affairs officers on several O'ahu military bases were laced with similarly self-referential understandings; questions about the military's relation to Hawai'i were answered with observations about the military's relation to itself. Praise of heterogeneity, such as that encountered when young soldiers travel to distant lands and meet unusual people, were framed within a very homogeneous context. One public affairs officer noted with some pride that "When we come into a place we kind of adopt it" (Pfister, 1991). Another noted that the military gets to know a place, settles in, and adjusts it to themselves (McCouch, 1991). One might call this an example of what William James called viciously acquired naivete: military representatives call it knowing the place, when it looks more like a brief brush with a place as it is forced to know them.

The production of this self-referential discourse is hidden in plain sight in the interactions between the pedagogical and the performative moments in the production of truth claims. The pedagogical givens that animate the military's narrative include the implicit assumptions in war talk about masculinity and soldiering that make the dead into heroes, rather than, say, victims or killers or dupes or confused young men with mixed motives. The pedagogical moment further occurs in national security discourse's historical telos, which takes as given that Hawai'i is part of the United States, to be understood in relation to the United States. The performative strategies include all those rhetorical gestures and grammatical devices that produce the Hawai'i the military needs. Other aspects of Hawai'i, its competing histories and politics, constitute a non-eligible otherness, "a situation of excess, in which the meanings and identities crucial to [the dominant] assumptions cannot be contained or sustained" (Doty, 1996a: 176). Some excess is inevitable in any narrative because the relation between the pedagogical and the performative can get unruly: making and hiding what seems simply to *be there* always contains a glimpse of the "there" as made and the making as hidden.

Naming examples of this excess highlights the dominant narrative's efforts at containment by attending to its loose ends, its valiant efforts, its stubborn moments of incompleteness. Such messiness flags sites of ongoing deferral, places where the military's story of itself in Hawai'i becomes more obviously intertwined with contending voices and resistant material. These sites of deferral are themselves, of course, unstable discursive formations, hosting their own debts to otherness, their own necessary deferrals, their own dilemmas concerning boundaries and exclusions. Our point is not to find a stable or innocent reality

behind militaristic appearances, nor a pure periphery that can replace a tainted center. Rather, by pointing to the necessary incompleteness and complicated interdependencies of all claims to meaning, we are arguing for a politics that attends to heteroglossia and honors difference.

Constituting the Local

Some aspects of the implicit unruliness of Hawai'i's spaces could be its unique geographic bodies of land and water. While active volcanoes, annual hurricane seasons and the occasional tidal wave are not of course unique to Hawai'i, the potent combination markedly differentiates Hawai'i from other parts of the United States. It is difficult to ignore the materiality of land, sky and ocean, conventionally coded as feminine Nature vis-a-vis masculine Culture. Palm trees and beaches, endlessly represented as seductions in the international discursive economies of tourism, are sites for more than sunbathing and snorkeling: they are powerful ongoing scenes for local resistance to "development." The body of law in Hawai'i includes certain indigenous principles of land use within its western property laws. By Hawai'i state law, all beaches, except those controlled by the military, are public up to the debris line (defined as the highest point upon which ocean debris is deposited, therefore the highest tide point). The Hawai'i Supreme Court has suggested in *Public Access Shoreline Hawaii (PASH) v. Hawaii County Planning Commission* "that every development permit issued to a property owner requires determination of the existence of native-use rights" (Boylan, 1996: A-10). In addition to sending "developers" into fits of anxiety, these and other rulings have stimulated a number of grassroots efforts to preserve beaches and their surrounding locales from construction and privatization.³

Like geographic bodies, human bodies have a somewhat different public presence in Hawai'i. Men and women in suits look a bit out of place in most social spaces, where "aloha wear" and muu-muus both commercialize a local custom and transgress a national one. Greater variety in skin color accompanies greater exposure of skin. The most popular and successful athletic event is wahine (women's) volleyball, which plays to sold-out audiences at the university stadium despite the game's availability on local cable TV stations (Chadwin, 1996). Other popular sports include women's softball and women's basketball; the visible presence of strong and active female bodies forms a regular part of public culture. Surfing, boogie boarding, canoe racing, skin diving and snorkeling take female and male bodies into public exposure in ways relatively uncommon on most of the mainland, connoting both unusual sports and active border crossings between land and water.

3 An earlier court decision in *Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Company* 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982) along with the PASH decision show the state courts as recognizing certain longstanding native Hawaiian claims. See MacKenzie 1991.

Other sorts of public bodies manifest themselves in the local sex trade, much of which addresses itself to a military clientele. In a recent study of prostitution on O'ahu, RaeDeen M. Keahiolalo (1995) found that nine out of the ten prostitutes interviewed said military men made up over 60% of their customers. All six of the military men she interviewed estimated that as much as 90% of military men participate in prostitution while on deployment. All five of the social workers she interviewed, most of whom work with sexual laborers, agreed that prostitution is more extensive in areas occupied by the military. While this study provides only an impression, it nonetheless gestures toward an explosive issue that the military and its civic boosters in Hawai'i are understandably reluctant to explore. When the huge U.S. military presence in Okinawa became controversial, catalyzed by the highly publicized rape of a young girl by three U.S. servicemen, Governor Benjamin Cayetano was quick to welcome the transfer of those troops to Hawai'i.⁴ Evidently unmoved by the possibilities of inviting similar actions in his home state, the governor also failed to interpret the warning embedded in Commander Macke's much publicized remark: "For the price they paid to rent the car they could have had a girl" (Landers, 1995: A3). Amidst the uproar occasioned by then-CINCPAC commander's casual recognition of prostitution around military bases, few have noted that the former commander was right - the soldiers could have easily and cheaply "had a girl." Governor Cayetano's eagerness to host more U.S. troops in Hawai'i would similarly stimulate the sex trade that already flourishes in parts of Chinatown, Wahiawa, and Hotel Street.

Still other kinds of bodies became visible in the highly publicized trial of *Baehr v. Lewin*, in which three gay couples sued the state for the right to marry.⁵ While the constitutional referendum on the issue found that a majority of voters of Hawai'i opposed same sex marriage, a significant minority (about one third) supported it. In hosting this controversial challenge against compulsory heterosexuality, the state is continuing its relatively liberal civil rights traditions, including its early legalization of abortion in 1970 and its prompt ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment "less than two hours after the Congressional vote" (O'Donnell, 1996: 14). In its initial ruling in *Baehr v. Lewin* the First Circuit Court of Hawai'i interpreted the case within Hawai'i's "history of tolerance for all peoples and their cultures" (O'Donnell, 1996: 14).

4 Governor Cayetano made this remark at a reception for the Okinawan Women's Peace Caravan, a group of women travelling around the U.S. to raise public awareness of the impact of the immense U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The reception was held at Washington Place (the governor's mansion), Honolulu, February 14, 1996.

5 *Baehr v. Lewin* 852 P.2d at 54 (Haw 1993). In May, 1993 and again in December, 1996, the Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled in favor of three same-sex couples who had brought suit against the state in protest of its refusal to grant them marriage licenses. For an informative discussion of the implications of this case for gay and lesbian politics, see O'Donnell 1996b. In a 1999 referendum voters were asked if they wished to amend the state constitution in order to limit marriage to heterosexual couples. Approximately 69% of the voters endorsed the constitutional change.

The colonial traffic in tropical bodies that produced Hawai'i's multiethnic present also marks another arena of excess in relation to the discourses of militarism. Certainly most localities in the United States could narrate a particular, layered history that defies the flattening of meaning imposed by militarized narratives. Yet Hawai'i is unique in that its colonizations are more recent, and its racial geographies more diverse. The constant production and reproduction of what it means to be "local" is an indication of both anxiety about and resistance to hegemonic structures of meaning. The *Honolulu Advertiser* ran a series in its "Island Life" section asking readers to contribute their definitions of "local," which many did; a regular column in that same paper featured "things local" and was taken to task for offending tourists; the publication *Bamboo Ridge* hosts animated ongoing debates about what does and does not constitute local literature. The pros and cons of speaking pidgin (the local dialect, a rich and musical stew of English, Hawaiian, and various Asian languages) are hotly contested. Local food, local footwear, local music, local drama, local poetry, local fashion...each of these are publicly available sites of excess. They do not fit. In these ways, Hawai'i itself is a non-eligible otherness facing the national security state.

This local excess does not translate into an obvious unified resistance to militarized order. On the contrary, local people interact with the military presence in far more complex ways than straightforward rejection, or happy acceptance. The local National Guard is an institutional site that many local men and women turn to their advantage, acquiring therein a needed second or third job and a tuition waiver for the University of Hawai'i. Over four thousand civilian workers are employed at Pearl Harbor shipyards, and while some of them are brought in from the mainland most are local skilled and unskilled laborers. Several privately owned shipyards depend on federal contracts, rendering more local workers dependent on military spending. Many local businesses depend on military customers. Our point is not that local people and local cultures constitute a fixed periphery in relation to the militarized center, but rather that the rich multiple sites of localness are themselves excessive vis-a-vis a militarized order.

At the same time, by ordering service members to Hawai'i, the military significantly changes the demographic arrangements of the state. When the 5th Cavalry Regiment occupied Schofield Barracks in 1909, "it was the greatest influx of American blood" Hawai'i had ever witnessed (Joesting, 1972: 282). Consequently, because military personnel are a strong minority in Hawai'i, they have the ability to change the unique character of the islands and to force the local culture to become more "acceptable" (Lind, 1984/85: 25). Service members are often segregated from the general populace because an "enormous military ghetto is created with complete on-base housing, shopping, and recreational facilities" (Gray, 1972: 15). The average tour in Hawai'i, for both officers and enlisted, is three years, but for many, much of this time is spent out at sea or on deployments to East Asia. This leaves little time or initiative to acculturate the

service member to the local scene. Military personnel are often indistinguishable, except perhaps by their distinctive haircuts, from the tourists who may also believe that Waikiki is the center of Hawaiian culture.

The borders separating military personnel from the surrounding community are permeable, hosting multiple kinds of commodity and labor exchanges across militarized boundaries. Yet the military's self-understanding is firmly located within what Michael Shapiro calls "the sovereignty impulse," which "militates in the direction of drawing firm boundaries around the self, of unambiguously specifying individual and collective identities, of privileging and rationalizing aspects of a homogeneous and eligible subjectivity." Sovereignty practices, by this understanding, work to constitute "forms of non-eligible otherness," and to specify and contain "both the spaces in which subjects achieve eligibility and that in which the collective as a whole has dominion" (Shapiro, 1993: 2-3). Faced with Hawai'i's otherness, the military plays the sovereignty card with a vengeance: it draws firm boundaries around itself, specifies clearly who is in and who is out, privileges and naturalizes its own self-understandings, and constitutes Native Hawaiians and other locals as either useful and recruitable, or as outside the boundaries of eligibility. Interactions with locals are orchestrated on a public relations stage that is controlled much more by military interests than local ones. For instance, troops stationed in Hawai'i are sometimes utilized for "good neighbor" activities such as repairing schools or assisting with hurricane relief, but such crossings into local territories are done on the military's terms. It is the military which controls the resources which then may (or may not) be used to provide local assistance. If the schools were adequately funded in the first place (rather than losing out to the military in competition for scarce federal funds) they would not need military largesse.

Service members' perception of the state's residents seems to typify a perception of otherness generally associated with foreign nationals, an attitude that "we don't have anything in common with them and they don't have anything in common with us" (Menton and Tamura, 1989: 319). At least in some cases interaction between "locals" and military personnel is conditioned by "the attitudes of racial superiority freely expressed by the men in the service" (Lind 1968: 252). Occasional acts of overt violence by locals against service members, like those against tourists, are highly publicized and often framed in political terms, as ominous local assaults on harmless and defenseless outsiders. Such attacks engender considerable public handwringing by officials, while violence by service members is treated as individual misbehavior rather than as a consequence of an institutional presence.

More pervasive than the occasional physical confrontation between military personnel and local people is the general policy of separateness and the casual disregard for local culture and history combined with equally casual willingness to appropriate its symbols and resources. Military authorities selectively recruit certain local histories and indigenous symbols as accessory possessions for military use, domesticating potential excess by making it fit into

the hegemonic order. The insignia of the 25th Infantry Division (light), based at Schofield Barracks, for example, is the taro leaf (*kalo lau* - a basis of subsistence for traditional Native Hawaiians) with a lightning bolt emblazoned over it, in bright red and yellow (the traditional colors of the Hawaiian monarchy). The Army hotel at Ft. DeRussy, the services' main recreational center in the state, offers packaged popularized Hawaiian culture and is fitted with a Hawaiian name - Hale Koa (literally, the barracks). Navy ships arriving at Pearl Harbor are greeted with hula dancers on dock and gigantic plastic leis hung over their bows; Hawaiian words of greeting (*aloha*) and thanks (*mahalo*) dot the speeches of incoming commanders (Harris, 1991).

Military spokespersons also make Hawai'i appropriate for themselves by inserting their history into the history of local immigration, representing the military as simply one more unremarkable arrival. One military public affairs officer remarked to us, "Nobody's from here. So everyone's an outsider in Hawai'i" (McCouch, 1991). This configuration of border crossings eliminates critical differences between the Polynesians who voyaged here 2000 years ago, the missionaries and plantation laborers who arrived in the 19th century, and the soldiers who just got off the boat. Claims that everyone in Hawai'i is an immigrant serve to normalize the military's largely Caucasian presence and to erase the particular histories of labor immigration, conversion, and conquest.

Land and Meaning in Hawai'i

Periodic struggles over names highlight the marginalization of indigenous Hawaiians' claims to land by the military's ruthlessly hegemonic meaning practices. Because "many of the Marines have had difficulty pronouncing the names of the Hawaiian Islands," the Marine Barracks Hawaii, located at Pearl Harbor, held a "Rename the Islands Contest" in 1990. Some of the winning entries included "French Island" for the island of Hawai'i (named in honor of the commanding officer of the barracks) and Bush Island for Kaua'i (named after then-President George Bush). These Marines were following in the footsteps of their military fathers in claiming the power to discipline Hawai'i's linguistic excess. McClintock comments that "the desire to name expresses a desire for a single origin alongside a desire to control the issue of that origin" (McClintock, 1995: 28). Because the military initiated much of the official surveying and mapping of Hawai'i, they "haolefied" the names or perpetuated existent *haole* names.⁶ In Pearl Harbor (*Pu'uloa*) numerous areas have English designations that were formerly Hawaiian: Bishop Point (*Lae o Halekahi*), Hospital Point (*Lae o Keanapua'a*), Ford Island (*Moku'ume'ume*). The areas previously called *Kahauiki* and *Kumomo* have disappeared altogether with their

6 "Haolefied" is based on the Hawaiian word *haole*, meaning outsider. It has taken on a specific reference to Caucasians and here it means that the original Hawaiian names were changed to English or transliterated into English with little or no reference to their former names, meanings, or spellings. The word *haole* is a good example: it has become a common, if contested, word in English.

incorporation into Fort Shafter Military Reservation and West Lock (*Ka-ihu-o-Pala'ai*) Naval Magazine respectively. In 1948 the Army changed the name of the Mokule'ia Military Reservation to Dillingham Military Reservation, disparaging another Hawaiian word "that's too hard to pronounce" (*Honolulu Star Bulletin* 1948: 5). These acts of casual appropriation do more than insult the local people, although they accomplish that outcome also; they knit space into discourse differently, enabling new sets of linguistic relations and disabling old ones. They transform Hawaiian spaces into objects of military knowledge. The military's renaming of Hawai'i operates "as the agent of a linguistic fifth column, infiltrating and dividing the space stealthily, as an outpost supplying a ramifying network of grammatical and syntactical connections" (Carter, 1987: 58). Militarized names teach the landscape to speak differently, to offer itself for military use, to capitulate to possession, to cease reminding possessors of prior claims. Military re-naming arrests Hawaiian spaces, enclosing them in a network of approved associations, neutralizing their otherness (Carter, 1987: 61). Even the pressure of the Territorial Government in 1929 asking the War Department to rename Fort Weaver to Fort Kalakaua, in honor of Hawaii's last king, did not suffice against the military's "lordly power of bestowing names" (Nietzsche, 1956: 160).

Another space for the expression of Hawaii's excess is the abundance of historical and archeological sites, many on military land, and the political struggles they ignite. Many Hawaiian activists link preservation of these sites to the maintenance of their culture and religion. The types of important sites over which the military exercises stewardship include burial sites, *heiau* (religious sites), *ko'a* (fishing shrines), *loko i'a* (fish ponds), *lua* (habitation and shelter caves), and *haka* (terraced platforms). A 1979 study completed by the U.S. Army inventoried a total of 77 archeological sites, finding that 40 were still in existence, 5 had been "relocated," and 32 had either been destroyed or could not be found (USASCH, 1979: 102). Although the Army admits that its actions in Makua Valley have "adversely affected three archeological sites," it still believes that "Army protection reduces the likelihood of damage to the sites" (USASCH 1979: 138, vii). The peculiarity of this notion of protection becomes less puzzling once one realizes that it is not cultural artifacts but information that is being protected:

Continued preservation for many sites may not be necessary; only the preservation of site information is essential. Detailed recording, written description, photographs, scaled maps and drawings, and possible limited salvage excavations could constitute adequate mitigation of any subsequent site destruction (USASCH, 1979: 139).

The danger for the Navy is not that a way of life long under assault will be further desecrated, but that scientific data might be lost. Native Hawaiian cultural and spiritual otherness is rendered undisturbing by folding it into a scientific model.

Perhaps the most highly politicized and public excess evading and contesting a militarized order in Hawai'i are some of the Native Hawaiian political groups. The Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement, hosting complex contending perspectives on indigenous identities, national memberships, and control of land, provides a space in which the flow across boundaries denaturalizes the ontological status of the boundaries themselves. In contrast, the military's own narratives mobilize what Doty calls "the ontological commitment to the state":

The ontological commitment to the state ensures that the starting point is the existence of boundaries that are then transgressed, rather than the always-in-process practices that effect the construction of contingent, and never finally fixed, boundaries (Doty, 1996b: 176-177).

The sovereignty movement calls into question a number of boundaries and agitates a variety of familiar assumptions, raising questions about how to interpret ethnic differences, about who counts as a citizen, about how space is to be named and ordered. The internal politics of the movement are complex and dispersed, very much in process, offering a number of different interpretations of what sovereignty might mean and how it might be achieved.⁷ The movement draws upon a long history of resistance to the U.S. government, including numerous rebellions against the initial colonizers, against the dominance of foreigners in the monarchy, against the 1893 overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani by a small group of haole businessmen and the U.S. Marines, and against Hawai'i's incorporation into statehood.⁸ None of these rebellions are mentioned in the very public historical narratives presented at the Fort DeRussy Army Museum, the *Arizona* memorial, the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, or any other site of militarized memory in Hawai'i. The process of enforcing militarized silences offer a glimpse of "statecraft as the never finally completed project of working to fix meaning, authority, and control" (Doty, 1996b: 177).

Sovereignty itself, no matter how defined, is not an unproblematic claim. In some ways it is easily recuperated into the dominant narrative - it does, after all, seem to aspire ultimately to the establishment of new territorial and political boundaries, not to the exchange of meaning across boundaries. But Hawaiian notions of sovereignty are not yet fixed, they remain in contest, offering the possibility of "a fluid and deterritorialized understanding of space that is at least

7 For a brief description of the main sovereignty groups, see Omandan, 1995 and Castanha, 1996.

8 The history of Native Hawaiian resistance to the military in particular and to colonization in general is extraordinarily complex. Much of the opposition was covered only in the native language press, and still receives little attention in English sources (see Bell, 1984; Kent, 1993; Kuykendall, 1967). While this history resists adequate summary, a few prominent instances can be named.

potentially incompatible with the static notion of space inherent in the modern system of territorially based nation-states". As a contemporary flow across existing boundaries the sovereignty movement features discourse's performative moment, "contesting the givenness of social space". The voices in the sovereignty movement "denaturalize the space of the sovereign state by raising issues of political authority, political community, and national identity - things that governments would like to have taken for granted" (Doty, 1996b: 178).

The sovereignty movement operates in the ambiguous margin between pedagogical and performative, confounding the foundational essence that the military narrative writes upon Hawai'i, even if it is sometimes in the name of a competing foundational essence. Other political movements, some of them related to the sovereignty campaign, others anchored elsewhere, operate in this ambiguous margin. A full page ad in *The New York Times* on July 7, 1995, sponsored by the Hawai'i Ecumenical Coalition, asked "Is it time to give back Hawai'i?" The Coalition was also active in protesting the Star Wars projects at Barking Sands missile launching facility on the island of Kaua'i. The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) organizes periodic anti-military protests, including an annual "Caravan for Peace" to "focus on the historical, economic, social, and environmental impacts of the massive presence of the US military and envision what a demilitarized future might be" (n.d., n.p.). The AFSC also produces and distributes a brief pamphlet called "Hawaiian Lands and the Military," describing the historical processes by which the US military gained control of "ceded lands" which belonged to the Hawaiian monarchy prior to the 1893 overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani. These lands are often sites of contest among the state, the military, and "developers." The political battles fought on ceded lands both draw upon and stimulate the sovereignty movement, constantly irritating the seamlessness of militarized narratives with contending interpretations of who is entitled to speak and what needs to be said.

Some of these land battles are relatively well-known to the general public in Hawai'i, due to persistent media coverage, while others are more obscure. Makua valley, a lush 7,200 acres on the Wai'anae coast of O'ahu, was seized in 1941 under martial law and has since been a site of struggle between local residents, state authorities, and the U.S. military. In 1983 the military, referring to the Native Hawaiians living on the beach as "squatters," pressured then-Governor Ariyoshi to evict them (Rohrer, 1995). This highly publicized incident is but one eviction in an ongoing series of concrete struggles over land. Other struggles in Makua concern the "open detonation of surplus ordnance and open burn of toxic military and hospital wastes" (Rohrer, 1995: 6) and the environmental challenge to the military's destruction of the habitat of the endangered Hawaiian tree snail (*Achatinella*) (Rohrer, 1995: 5). Army secretary Togo West, Jr. dismissed the protests by invoking the magical, self-justifying incantation, national security: the protests "must be weighed against the mission of the Army, which is to protect national security interests" (Rohrer, 1995: 8). But it is unclear exactly what "weighing" is going on, when "national security"

performs in the hegemonic discourse as a self-referential reassurance rather than as a contestable concept.

Lualualei, another large parcel in the Waiʻanae area, is also a publicly contested space, with grassroots groups and, sometimes, state officials pressuring the federal government to return land and raising questions about the health risks of electromagnetic radiation from a Navy transmitter there (Rohrer 1995: 13). A somewhat less publicized land battle on the Windward coast of Oʻahu is the Kamaka family's court battle with the Navy and Marines to keep their 187 acre farm in the Waikane Valley (Tummons, 1992: 4-7). Sovereignty activists politicize the prevailing spatial arrangements by pointing out, for example, that the University of Hawaiʻi sits on ceded lands or that the popular Ala Moana Shopping Center occupies land stolen from Hawaiian farmers (Ishtar, 1994: 102).

Environmental activists similarly politicize the ecological consequences of military land and water use. Pearl Harbor resides on the superfund list of toxic waste sites, even while the local press took pains to assure readers that a sizeable oil spill there in 1996 posed no danger to the environment. Like the periodic violent acts of military personnel toward their families or others, the military's violence to the land is generally treated in the mainstream media as unfortunate and separate incidents rather than as evidence of a damaging institutional presence. It is in the Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement and some environmental organizations that the military's effects on local land and people are thematized as institutional practices rather than discrete events.

Perhaps the most well-known of the Native Hawaiian struggles with the U.S. military over land, and the most intimately connected with the growing sovereignty movement, is that over the island of Kahoʻolawe. Kahoʻolawe is the smallest of the eight main islands in the Hawaiian chain, consisting of 28,000 acres and home to a host of rich and ancient archeological sites as well as endangered plants and rare insects. Used for ranching prior to martial law, the island was taken over by the Navy and used for bombing practice from 1940 to 1990. A grassroots organization called The Protect Kahoʻolawe ʻOhana began a vigorous campaign in 1975 to halt the bombing and return the island to the Hawaiian people. Moving from the fringe to the center of state politics in only a few years, the campaign garnered the support of the state's Congressional delegation, and was ultimately successful. Included in the National Register of Historical Places in 1981, Kahoʻolawe was bombed for another 9 years until in 1990 President Bush ordered a temporary halt to the bombing. Four years later the Congress voted to stop the bombing permanently and allocate funds for cleanup and restoration of the island (Rohrer, 1995: 21). The recovery of Kahoʻolawe has stimulated hopes for other successful struggles with the military for land. "As one activist reportedly said to another during the ceremony of return, 'One down, seven to go'" (Merrill, 1994: 236).

The singular successes of the Protect Kahoʻolawe ʻOhana and some other local land struggles take place against the dense background din of militarized

discourses and the continuing immense presence of militarized institutions. When Congressman Neil Abercrombie made modest suggestions about returning some of the military land at Bellows Air Field in Waimanalo to the state, he was subjected to an unabated flood of accusations about being “anti-military,” even though he has consistently supported expansion of military housing and infrastructure in the state (Napier, 1995: 114; Abercrombie, 1993). The disjuncture between the continued public presence of challenges to military land holdings from Native Hawaiian and environmental groups, and the hysterical response to Congressman Abercrombie's mild criticisms of selected aspects of military land use, suggests both that contestatory voices are audible and that the hegemonic views are still firmly in control. Despite their successes, the Native Hawaiian and environmental groups have as yet created little public space for thorough critiques of the military's occupation of Hawai'i. In this sense the necessary space for facilitating contending voices is curtailed. A possible democratic rewriting of Hawai'i's social spaces requires discourse that calls attention to the prevailing assumptions in order to make room for more critical perspectives. In Roxanne Doty's words, critical thinking must insist on calling attention to the performative in order to make the pedagogical able to be contested: “It is at this ambiguous margin that the double-writing of statecraft takes place and that the nation-states' identity, authority, and sovereignty are written and rewritten, but never finally fixed in a stable and unambiguous way” (Doty, 1996b: 180).

This essay aims to stimulate a different pedagogy, one that is able to call attention to the taken for granted *as* taken for granted, to risk putting itself into question. We also wish to enable different kinds of performances, different relations between the centers and peripheries of political discourse, so that the production of meaning claims is more readily contestable, more open to difference. The relations between militarized centers and struggling peripheries are established and maintained by an ongoing process of constituting hegemonic order: land is seized, names are changed, resources are reallocated, people are moved, ways of life are destroyed. Local resistances both challenge and consort with prevailing practices, intertwining power and resistance in complex ways. By enhancing attention to the inherent ambiguities in militarized order, and to the violence entailed in writing and re-writing this order onto potentially resistant bodies, we hope to stimulate more heteroglossic political narratives and a greater space for resistance.

References

- Abercrombie, N. (1993) Interview. Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives, first district, Hawai'i. December 15.
- Ali, M. (1991) *Loko Iha* and Modern Aquaculture, Unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Hawai'i, Honolulu.
- American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) (n.d.) *Hawaiian Lands and the Military*. Hawai'i Area Program Office, 2426 O'ahu Avenue, Honolulu, Hawai'i, 96822.
- Bell, R. (1984) *Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Bhabha, H. (1990) Dissemination: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation. In Bhabha, H.(ed) *Nation and Narration* New York: Routledge, pp. 291-322.
- Borg, J. (1990) Hawaiians Want Lualualei. *Honolulu Advertiser* C-9. August 3.
- Boylan, D. (1996) Courting Supreme Controversy. *Midweek: A* 10-11. August 21.
- Carter, P. (1987) *The Road to Botany Bay: An Exploration of Landscape and History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Castanha, A. (1996) Roles of Non-Hawaiians in the Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement. Unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Hawai'i, Honolulu.
- Chadwin, D. (1996) Ohanaball. *The Honolulu Weekly* 6: 48: 5-8. November 27-December 3.
- Cohn, C. (1987) Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals. *Signs* 12 (Summer): 687-718.
- Connolly, W. (1991) *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Cook, J. (1967) *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery: The Voyage of the Resolution and Discovery 1776-1780*. Vol 3, parts 1, 2. J.C. Beaglehole (ed) Cambridge:Published for the Hakluyt Society, Cambridge University Press.
- Daws, G. (1968) *The Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands*. New York: Macmillan.
- Doty, R. (1966a) The Double-Writing of Statecraft: Exploring State Responses to Illegal Immigration. *Alternatives*, 21: 171-189.
- Doty, R. (1996b) *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Enloe, C. (1990) *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Enloe, C. (1993) *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- First Hawaiian Bank (1993) *The Role of the Military in Hawaii's Economy*. Honolulu. May.
- Gray, F. (1972) *The Sugar-Coated Fortress*. New York: Random House.
- Griffin, J. (1991) Uncertainty, instability: new Pacific watchwords. *The Honolulu Star Bulletin and Advertiser: Focus* 3. March 31.
- Haraway, D. (1989) *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science*. NY: Routledge.
- Harris, G. (1991) Interview. Lieutenant, U.S. Navy. March 15.
- Hartung, W. (1997) Military Monopoly. *The Nation* 264:2:6-7. January 13/20.
- Hawai'i Ecumenical Coalition. (1995) Is it time to give back Hawai'i? *The New York Times*. July 7.
- Honolulu Advertiser* (1996) Sailor Attacked at Waimea Bay. A-3. June 20.
- Honolulu Star Bulletin* (1948): 5. March 23.
- Honolulu Star Bulletin* (1991): A-17. March 12.
- Ishtar, Z. (1994) *Daughters of the Pacific*. North Melbourne, Australia: Spinifex Press.
- Ivins, M. (1996) Subsidizing the Merchants of Death. *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*: A-8. August 5.
- Joesting, E. (1972) *Hawaii: An Uncommon History*. New York: Norton and Colm.
- Johnson, T. (1991) Interview. Captain, Army Reserve Officer Training Program (ROTC), University of Hawai'i. Recruiting Operations Officer. January 31.

- Keahiolalo, R. M. (1995) "A Site for Conquest - The Female Body in Militarized Prostitution." Unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Hawai'i, Honolulu.
- Kent, N. (1983) *Hawai'i: Islands Under the Influence*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Klein, B. (1989) The Textual Strategies of the Military: Or Have You Read Any Good Defense Manuals Lately? In Der Derian, J. and Shapiro, M., (eds.) *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.
- Kuykendall, R. (1966) *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874: Twenty Critical Years*. Vol. 2. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Kuykendall, R. (1967) *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893: The Kalakaua Dynasty*. Vol. 3. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Landers, P. (1995) Macke storm envelops Gore. *Honolulu Advertiser*, A-3, November 19.
- Lind, A. (1968) Service-Civilian Tension in Honolulu. In Hormann, B. (ed) *Community Forces in Hawaii*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, pp. 248-53.
- Lind, I. (1984/85) Ring of Steel: Notes on the Militarization of Hawai'i. *Social Process in Hawai'i* 31: 25-47.
- MacKenzi, M. (1991) *Native Hawaiian Rights Handbook*. Honolulu: Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation.
- Marine Barracks of Hawaii Monthly Newsletter. 1990. Edition XIV. Pearl Harbor: Puller Press. Nov/Dec.
- McClintock, A. (1995) *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge).
- McCouch, N. (1991) Interview. U.S. Army Captain, Public Affairs Officer. 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks. March 8.
- Menton, L. and Tamura, E. (1989) *A History of Hawai'i*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Merrill, C. (1994) A Little Justice in Hawai'i. *The Nation* 259: 236. Sept 5/12.
- Napier, A. (1995) What's It All For? The Military in Hawai'i. *Honolulu Magazine*: 42-45, 114-21. August.
- Nietzsche, F. (1956) *The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals*. Trans. Francis Golfing. New York: Doubleday Anchor.
- O'Donnell, S. (1996) A 'New Choreography of Sexual Difference' or just the Same Old Song and Dance? *Socialist Review* 25:1:95-118.
- Omandan, P. (1995) In Search of a Nation. *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*. A-1. August 24.
- Pfister, J. (1991) Interview. Public Affairs Officer, United States Marine Corps, CINCPACFLT. Camp H.M. Smith. May 5.
- Rohrer, J. (1995). "Hawaiian Sovereignty and the Military Occupation of Hawaiian Lands." Unpublished paper. Department of Political Science, University of Hawai'i. Honolulu.
- Said, E. (1979) *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Sennott, C. (1996) Armed for Profit: The Selling of U.S. Weapons. *The Boston Globe*: B 1-12. February 11.
- Shapiro, M. (1993) *Reading "Adam Smith": Desire, History and Value*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Silva, N. (forthcoming) *Ke Ku'e Kupa'a loa nei Makou: A Study of Hawaiian Resistance to Colonization*. Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press.
- Soguk, N. 1995. *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of State*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Spain, L. (1995) Cut Foreign Arms Sales. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 51:5:47-48. September/October.
- Tummons, P. (1992) Death Valley. *Honolulu Weekly*: 4-7. September 30.
- United States Congress. (1993) Pacific Rim Issues. *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations United States Senate*. 103rd Congress. Washington: Government Printing Office.

- United States Department of Defense. (1995) *Hawaii Land Use Master Plan/United States Pacific Command*. Camp H.M. Smith, Hawai'i: U.S. Pacific Command.
- USASCH (United States Army Support Command, Hawaii). 1979 *Environmental Impact Statement*. Fort Shafter, Hawai'i.
- Vartabedian, R. (1997) Lockheed, Northrop to Merge: \$1.6 Billion Deal May Cost 10,000 Jobs. *Honolulu Advertiser*: B-8, B-7. July 4.
- Webb, G. (1996) The Dark Alliance. *The San Jose Mercury News*, August 18, 19, 20.